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Abstract
Standard actuarial approaches for non-life insurance products suggest that the premium
is divided into three main components: the actuarial price, the safety loading, and the
loading for expenses. The number of product-specific policies from different companies
has increased significantly, and strong market competition has boosted the demand for
a competitive premium in global insurance market. Thus, the actuarial premium could
eventually be altered by an insurer’s marketing and management department regarding
the competitive environment. Thus in this thesis, considering the competition in in-
surance market, game theoretical approaches are applied to investigate the influence of
competition on general insurance pricing.
Firstly, a two-period deterministic N-player game is formulated to investigate the
optimal pricing strategy by calculating the Nash equilibrium in an insurance market.
Under that framework, each insurer is assumed to maximise its utility of wealth over
the unit time interval. By analyzing the competition between each pair of insurers, the
whole markets’ competition is characterized through an aggregation. With the purpose
of solving a game of N-players, the best-response potential game with non-linear ag-
gregation is implemented. The existence of a Nash equilibrium is proved by finding a
potential function of all insurers’ payoff functions. A 12-player insurance game illus-
trates the theoretical findings under the framework in which the best-response selection
premium strategies always provide the global maximum value of the corresponding
payoff function.
Secondly, deterministic differential games are constructed with the purpose of study-
ing the insurers’ equilibrium premium in a competitive market. We apply an optimal
viii
control theory to determine the open-loop Nash equilibrium premium strategies. In this
direction, two models are formulated and studied. The market power of each insur-
ance company is characterized by a price sensitive parameter, and the business volume
is affected by the solvency ratio. Considering the average market premiums, the first
model studies an exponential relation between premium strategies and volume of busi-
ness. The other model initially characterizes the competition between any selected pair
of insurers, then aggregates all the paired competitions in the market. Numerical ex-
amples illustrate the premium dynamics, and show that premium cycles may exist in
equilibrium.
Thirdly, a multi-stage stochastic game will be constructed. Insurers are considered
to be risk-averse, that is, insurers will to set risk-premiums on their products with the
purpose of avoiding risk. Mean-variance Utility function will be adopted. The expendi-
tures of insurance companies will be discussed separately as exposure related costs and
non-exposure related costs. The expenditures of insurance companies will be discussed
separately as exposure related costs and non-exposure-based costs. The exposure-based
component is assumed to be stochastic.
Finally, summary of the conclusions complete the thesis.
Keywords: Insurance Market Competition; Non-life Insurance; Non-cooperative Game;
Potential Game with Aggregation; Pure Nash Equilibrium; Price Cycles; Solvency Ra-
tio
ix
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Athanasios A. Pantelous. I feel extremely
fortunate to have worked with a great mathematical mind and a great man over the last
few years and I hope to continue our collaboration in the future. I would also like to
mention Dr Yohan Pelosse and Dr Tim Boonen for their academic support.
Additional, I would like to thank my father Mr. Zhihe Wu and my mother Mrs.
Aiqun Cao for their love and support for me.
Finally, I would like to thank all of my lovely friends during the four years for their
friendship. My life at Liverpool was made enjoyable in large part due to the time with
Kun Cao, Fan Fei, Vasileios Fragkoulis, Haochen Hua, Jiajie Li, Weihong Ni, Zhichao
Rong, Fei Yang, Shaonan Zhang and etc.
x
Publications
R. WU and A.A. Pantelous. Potential games with aggregation in non-cooperative gen-
eral insurance markets. ASTIN Bulletin, 47(1):269-302,2017. ( Chapter 2)
xi
Chapter 1
Introduction
A general insurance policy is an agreement between insurer and policyholder. Policy-
holder pays the premium while insurance company agrees to repay the policyholder for
unpredictable losses within the contract time period. In the insurance world, the deter-
mination of an appropriate and attractive premium is always a highly challenging issue
also because of the competition between different companies. Furthermore, the pre-
mium loading depends critically on the price that other insurers charge for comparable
policies. Clapp [8] demonstrates using the seminal model by Rothschild and Stiglitz’s
([51, 50]) that companies are able to use the quantity of insurance to compete for cus-
tomers and, consequently, a bigger volume of business or a market share. By changing
the level of indemnity while holding the premium rate constant (quantity competition),
it is possible to induce customers to reveal their risk class.
On the other hand, insurance premiums contribute to the wealth while claims and
other expenses counteract theoretically the growth of the insurer. Insurance pricing is
a fundamental aspect that attracts the interest for both actuaries and academics. Stan-
dard actuarial approaches for non-life insurance products suggest that the premium is
claimed to be divided into three main components: the actuarial price, the safety load-
ing and the loading for expenses. The actuarial price is normally deduced according to
different premium principles, such as the Net Premium Principle, the Expected Value
Premium Principle, etc. (for overview of principles of premium pricing, see [49], [58]).
1
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Classical approaches focus on determining the safety loading of each policy class pro-
portional to the expected claim expenses or to the moment of it.
1.1 Motivation
However, in highly competitive environments which are dominated by a relatively small
number of insurance companies (comparing with the magnitude and quantity of the
finance-related firms), each insurer monitors, tries to predict reactions and takes ad-
vantages against the others, the actuarial premium might be altered eventually by the
marketing and management department due to several reasons, such as the affordability
of customers, the market conditions and the mutualization across the portfolio of cus-
tomers to decrease risk. It is also proposed that the pricing cycles which can be found in
different lines of insurance are affected by market competition, see [22]. These sugges-
tions indicate that the insurance premium price should not be focused only on the risk
perspectives. In order to study the competition between all insurers, a model is needed
to be constructed to research on insurers’ premium pricing interactions in a competitive
insurance market.
1.2 Developments in Competitive Insurance Markets
This area of research has attracted the interest of many academics lately, but still there
is little literature that has been done on how the competition might affect the insurance
premiums and how the insurers will respond to changes in the levels of premiums being
offered by the competitors.
Taylor [54] is the first from the actuarial community who mentioned that the compe-
tition is a key component for the insurance premium pricing, and he used the Australian
market to extract some very useful remarks. From his study, the cyclical behaviour
of the premium rates seems peculiar and raises several questions. For instance ”what
the market is attempting to achieve by such pricing” and ”what individual insurers
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are attempting to achieve in following the market”. Analytically, the relation between
the market’s behaviour and the optimal response of an individual insurer was explored,
whose objective is to maximize the expected present value of the wealth arising over
a pre-defined finite time horizon period. He also assumed that the insurance products
display a positive price-elasticity of demand. Thus, if the market as a whole begins
underwriting at a loss, any attempt by a particular insurer to maintain profitability will
result in a reduction of its volume of business. According to Taylor’s results [54], the
optimal strategies do not follow what someone might expect. Therefore, he stated that
the optimal response depends upon various factors including:
• the predicted time which will elapse before a return of market rates into profitabil-
ity,
• the price elasticity of demand for the insurance product under consideration, and
• the rate of return required on the capital supporting the insurance operation.
In his next paper, Taylor [55] noted that the optimum underwriting strategies might
be substantially affected by the proper marginal expense rates which must be taken into
account. It was first showed that the optimal strategy is not affected by the introduction
of a component of fixed expenses, irrespective of the size of that component. However,
the strategy is affected if the concomitant of the introduction of fixed expenses is the
recognition of lower marginal expenses. It is possible to set limits on the effect of
expenses on optimal underwriting strategy. The sharpness of these limits depends on:
• the extent of variation in marginal expense rates as demand varies;
• the price-elasticity of demand.
After almost two decades of silence, Emms and Haberman [23] extended signif-
icantly Taylor’s ideas presented in [54, 55] considering the continuous form of his
model and particularly, they assumed that the average premium is a positive random
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process with finite mean at time t and left the distribution for the mean claim size pro-
cess unspecified. For two choices of the demand function, a smooth optimal control
was calculated.
Later, Emms et al. [18] modelled market’s average premium as a geometric Brown-
ian motion. Consequently, the optimal strategy has two modes depending on the model
parameters: a) either set an infinite premium and accumulate wealth from the existing
customer base or b) set the premium at just above break-even in order to maximize
market exposure whilst at the same time making a profit. Consequently, the optimal
strategy for two particular approaches was investigated to adjust the premium. The
first approach was based on a linear function of the market average premium, while the
second one involved a linear combination of the break-even premium and the market
average premium.
Simultaneously, Emms [25] determined the optimal strategy for an insurer which
maximizes a particular objective over a fixed planning horizon and the premium by
using a competitive demand model as well as the expected main claim size. Base on
his approach, it is not enough that an insurer set a price to cover the claims if the rest
of the market undercuts that price. Additionally, his demand law specified in such
a way that the insurer’s income and the exposure change was related to the market
premium. Moreover, in [19] he studied the optimal premium pricing process into a
competitive market with different types of constrains. Analytically, he calculated the
premium strategy which maximises the objective of the insurer subject to a constrain on
the control or constrains on the reserve that the insurer must hold. Premium restrictions
lead to control constrains, while solvency requirements lead to state constrains. By
assuming a deterministic control framework, the optimisation problem was solved by
using elements from control parametrisation; see [57].
Finally, a simpler parametrisation was introduced by Emms [21], which represents
the insurance market’s response to an insurer adopting a pricing strategy determined via
optimal control theory and claims are modelled using a lognormally distributed mean
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claim size rate. Analytically, a generalisation of the demand function which was men-
tioned in [19] had been considered which impacts significantly on the optimal premium
strategy for an insurer.
Taylor ([54, 55]) and Emms et al. ([23, 18, 25, 19, 20, 24, 21]) studied fixed pre-
mium strategies and the sensitivity of the model to its parameters involved. In their
approaches, the important parameters which determined the optimal strategies are the
ratio of initial market average premium to break-even premium, the measure of the
inverse elasticity of the demand function and the non-dimensional drift of the market
average premium. In [41], a stochastic demand function was first introduced for the
volume of business in a discrete-time set up extending further the previous ideas. Addi-
tionally, using also a linear discounted function for the wealth process of the company,
a closed form (endogenous) formula was derived for the optimal premium strategy of
the insurance company when it was expected to lose part of the market. Mathematically
speaking, a maximization problem has been proposed for the wealth process of a com-
pany, which has been solved using stochastic dynamic programming. Thus, the optimal
controller (i.e. the premium) has been defined endogenously by the market as the com-
pany struggles to increase its volume of business into a competitive environment with
the same characteristics as in the previous literature.
In [42], the volume of business was formed to be a general stochastic demand func-
tion extending further the ides presented in [41] making the model more pragmatic and
realistic. Thus, for the formulation of the volume of business, the company’s reputation
is also considered. According to [9], company’s reputation has a strong influence on
buying decisions or in other words, on the demand of the company’s product. So, in
that case the function for the volume of business emphasizes the ratio of the markets
average to the company’s premium, the past year experience, the company’s reputation
and a stochastic disturbance.
Very recently, in [43], the analytical solutions for some common special cases and
a premium strategy concerning market’s average premium is considered. In that paper
the disturbance of the volume of business function was denoted by the set of all other
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stochastic variables that are considered to be relevant to the demand function (moreover,
they are assumed to be independently distributed in time and Gaussian). What is more,
the volume of business was modelled as a nonlinear function with respect to reserve,
the premium, the noise and a quadratic performance criterion concerning the utility
function to be implemented.
Except the idea of optimal pricing for general insurance, other approaches are also
adopted to study the premium pricing. [56] constructs a simple but realistic insurance
model to study the stability of premium rates, profitability, and the market concentra-
tion. The competitive premium is a maximum selection between several strategies.
The exposure of the corresponding premium strategy of a selected insurer is calculated
through the exposure exchange among all insurers.
1.3 Game-Theoretic Approaches
However, for all the models and approaches discussed in the previous subsection, a com-
mon assumption has been made that there exists a single insurer whose pricing strategy
does not cause any reaction to the rest of the market’s competitors. Thus, each insurance
market participants’ reaction can not be observed. The market price is independent of
their own actions. In reality, this is not often the case. However, before we proceed fur-
ther with the recently developed game theoretic approaches, it should be mentioned that
Emms [21] released this assumption partially and he suggested a scenario where there
is a leader in the market whose pricing is followed by other insurance companies. A
simple parametrisation is introduced which represents the insurance market’s response
to an insurer’s pricing strategy.
Game theoretical approaches have been introduced mostly lately in the premium
pricing processes in non-life insurance products as they offer the opportunity to ob-
serve the pricing competition among the whole insurance market. In other words, the
competition among insurers gives the pricing strategy of each market participants in a
constructed insurance game, while one can only get a single insurer’s pricing strategy
Chapter 1. Introduction 7
through optimal control approach in previous studies. In this paper, as it will be dis-
cussed more extensively in the following subsection, a non-cooperative game model is
considered in a competitive insurance market.
The use of game theory in actuarial science has a long history. The first attempts
go back to Borch ([5, 6]) and Lemaire ([33, 34], who applied cooperative games to
model insurer and reinsurer’s risk transfer (for a review, see section 3.1 of [7]). Two
models were applied in non-life insurance markets for non-cooperative games: a) the
Bertrand oligopoly where insurers set premiums and b) the Cournot oligopoly where
insurers choose volume of business. See [44, 48, 17] for the Bertrand model and also
see [46, 45] for the Cournot model.
Emms [22] developed a model by applying a differential game-theoretic method-
ology. Under his framework, each insurer’s price depends on other insurers’ premium
strategies. The whole insurance market is considered as two component: the sum of all
insurers’ exposure and the unallocated insurance exposure. Two price functions are in-
vestigated: the quotient price function and the difference price function. The calculation
of the optimal pricing strategy requires the solution of multiple coupled optimization
problems.In [22], he got the solution in a two-player game considering the competition
as market average premium. What is more, two significant features of the model were
also investigated in details in his approach: the effect of the limited total demand for
policies and the uncertainty component for the determination of the break-even pre-
mium of an insurance policy.
Finally, very recently, Boonen [4] also proposed a way to optimally regulate bar-
gaining for risk redistributions. Thus, he investigated the strategic interaction between
two insurance companies who trade risk Over-the-Counter in one-period model. A Nash
Equilibrium may exist in a game which the trading of risks occurs Over-The-Counter
by restricting the strategy space a priori.
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1.4 A New Approach: Potential Game with Aggrega-
tion
In our approach, with the purpose of solving the problem while the insurance market
contains a large number of insurers, a two-stage insurance game is constructed which
considers the competition in pairs. Thus, instead of just assuming that the competition
is only through the market average premium, an aggregate game approach is formulated
in order to further investigate the insurance market competition. In that direction, the
Nobel-prize winning concept of aggregative game which was first proposed by Rein-
hard Selten in 1970 ([52]), who considered the aggregate as the sum of the players’
strategies, is applied broadly in our approach. Thus, the derived strategy for all the in-
surers in the insurance market is presented as a single parameter, i.e. the aggregate. In
more details, each insurers’ utility (payoff) function is only depended on its own pricing
premium strategy and the aggregate parameter.
Following also the suggestions by Taylor in [56], the market competition is mea-
sured through calculating an insurer’s new volume of exposure by summing up all the
policy flows during the competition between each other and the volume of exposure in
a previous stage. An non-linear aggregate is obtained, which presents the strategies of
all the insurers in the market. Moreover, a potential game approach is further investi-
gated in order to prove the existence of Nash equilibrium in the insurance game. This
approach also offers us an opportunity to simplify the problem of finding out Nash equi-
librium by solving one single optimization problem, however, not detailed discussion
will be provided here, as it is far beyond the scope of the present article.
Literature of potential games can trace back to Monderer and Shapley [38, 39], who
created the also Nobel-prize winning concept of a potential game based on a congestion
game. This proposed potential game technique does not only solve the congestion game
itself, but also it can be regarded as an equilibrium refinement tool. Following this idea,
the best-response potential games were introduced and characterized by Voorneveld in
[60]. In his paper, it was proposed that for any best-response potential game, if the
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potential has a maximum over its domain, the best-response potential game has a Nash
equilibrium.
Dubey et al. [16] were the first to embed the aggregate into potential games. Consid-
ering just a linear aggregation, they investigated a special type of best-response poten-
tial games which restrict the best-response selection that is continuously decreasing or
increasing function. Then, it is proved that any game with linear aggregation and a de-
creasing or increasing continuous best-response selection, belongs to pseudo-potential
games, which is pre-defined in their paper. By proving that any pseudo-potential game
have a pure Nash equilibrium strategy, the existence of Nash equilibrium was obtained
in this special class of potential game irrespective of whether strategy sets are convex
or payoff functions quasi-concave.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. A two-period deterministic N-player game
is formulated to investigate the optimal pricing strategy by calculating the Nash equilib-
rium in an insurance market in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 constructs deterministic differential
games with the purpose of studying the insurers’ equilibrium premium pricing in a com-
petitive market. A multi-stage stochastic game is constructed in Chapter 4, considering
the risk aversion of players. Chapter 5 is the conclusion which is the summary of this
thesis.
Chapter 2
Potential Games with Aggregation in
Non-cooperative General Insurance
Markets
In the global insurance market, the number of product-specific policies from different
companies has increased significantly, and strong market competition has boosted the
demand for a competitive premium. Thus, in the present paper, by considering the com-
petition between each pair of insurers, an N-player game is formulated to investigate
the optimal pricing strategy by calculating the Nash equilibrium in an insurance mar-
ket. Under that framework, each insurer is assumed to maximise its utility of wealth
over the unit time interval. With the purpose of solving a game of N-players, the best-
response potential game with non-linear aggregation is implemented. The existence
of a Nash equilibrium is proved by finding a potential function of all insurers’ pay-
off functions. A 12-player insurance game illustrates the theoretical findings under the
framework in which the best-response selection premium strategies always provide the
global maximum value of the corresponding payoff function.
Keywords: Insurance Market Competition; Non-life Insurance; Potential Game
with Aggregation; Pure Nash Equilibrium
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2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Motivation
In the insurance world, determining an appropriate and attractive premium is always a
highly challenging issue because of the competition among different companies. The
premium loading depends critically on the price that the other insurers charge for com-
parable policies. [8] was able to demonstrate it using the seminal model by [51, 50].
Insurance pricing is a fundamental aspect that attracts the interest of both actuaries and
academics. Standard actuarial approaches for non-life insurance products suggest that
the premium is divided into three main components: the actuarial price, the safety load-
ing, and the loading for expenses. The actuarial price is normally deduced according
to different premium principles, such as the Net Premium Principle, the Expected Value
Premium Principle, and others [49, 58]. Classical approaches focus on determining the
safety loading of each policy class proportional to the expected claim expenses or to its
moment.
However, in a highly competitive insurance environment which is dominated by a
relatively small number of companies (compared with the banking sector and invest-
ment funds), each insurer monitors, attempts to predict reactions, and takes advantages
against the others. Thus, the actuarial premium might eventually be altered by the mar-
keting and management department for several reasons, such as the customer’s afford-
ability, the market conditions, and the mutualisation across the portfolio of customers
to decrease risk. What is more, the pricing cycles, which are found in different lines of
insurance, appear also to be affected by market competition [47, 36, 22]. These sug-
gestions indicate that the insurance premium price should not focus only on the risk
assessment. Consequently, to study the competition among insurers, a model needs
to be formulated in order to investigate insurers’ premium pricing interactions in the
corresponding market.
For previous literatures research on optimal control theory, a common assumption
Chapter 2. Potential Games with Aggregation in Non-cooperative General Insurance
Markets 12
was made that there exists a single insurer, whose pricing strategy does not cause any
reaction to the rest of the market’s competitors. Thus, for each participant in the insur-
ance market, others reaction cannot be observed, and the premium remains eventually
unaffected by their actions. In reality, this situation is not often the case.
Game theoretical approaches have been introduced mostly in the premium pric-
ing processes of non-life insurance products. Competition among insurers reveals the
pricing strategy of each market participant in a constructed insurance game, whereas
one can only obtain a single insurer’s pricing strategy through optimal control used
in previous studies. However, in our approach, as it is discussed more extensively in
the following subsection, a non-cooperative game model is designed for the insurance
market implementing already well-defined parameters from the corresponding literature
[54, 55, 25, 42].
2.1.2 A New Approach: Potential Game with Aggregation
In our approach, a two-stage non-life insurance game is constructed in a competitive
market. Numerical solutions of Nash equilibria are obtained for a large number of in-
surers under the two-stage framework. Moreover, instead of simply parametrizing com-
petition through comparison between single insurer’s premium and the market average
premium as it has been done so far in the relevant literature, an aggregate game ap-
proach is formulated to investigate further the insurance market competition. Different
from [22], the existence of Nash equilibrium is proved under our framework.
The concept of aggregative game, which was first proposed by [52] by considering
it as the sum of the players’ strategies, is applied broadly in our approach. Thus, the
derived strategy for all insurers in the insurance market is presented as a single param-
eter, i.e., the aggregate. In greater detail, each insurer’s utility (payoff) function only
depends on its own pricing premium strategy and the aggregate parameter.
Also following the suggestions by [56] and [22], market competition is measured by
calculating an insurer’s new volume of exposure and by summing up all of the policy
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flows during the competition between the insurers and the volume of exposure in a
previous stage. A non-linear aggregate is obtained, which presents the strategies of all
insurers in the market. Moreover, a potential game approach is further developed to
prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the insurance game. This approach also
gives us an opportunity to simplify the problem of determining the Nash equilibrium by
solving a single optimisation problem.1
The literature on potential games can be traced back to [38, 39], who created the
potential game concept on the basis of a congestion game. Their technique did not only
solve the congestion game itself but also was regarded as an equilibrium refinement
tool. Following their idea, the best-response potential games were introduced and char-
acterised by [60]. His paper proposed that, for any best-response potential game, if the
potential has a maximum over its domain, the best-response potential game has a Nash
equilibrium.
[16] were the first to embed the aggregate into potential games. By considering just a
linear aggregation, they investigated a special type of best-response potential game that
restricts the best-response selection to a continuously decreasing or increasing function.
Then, any game with linear aggregation and a decreasing or increasing continuous best-
response selection is proved to belong to a pseudo-potential game, which is pre-defined
in their paper. By proving that any pseudo-potential game has a pure Nash equilibrium
strategy, the existence of a Nash equilibrium was obtained in this special class of poten-
tial games irrespective of whether strategy sets were convex or payoff functions were
quasi-concave.
In this paper, for the first time according to our knowledge, these two game-theoretic
techniques are successfully implemented to determine the premium strategy for mod-
elling competition in a non-life insurance market. Thus, in greater detail, a best-response
potential game with non-linear aggregation is constructed and discussed. Premiums
per unit of exposure are regarded as the premium strategy, which makes our game to
1We won’t discuss unnecessary technical details about how to introduce and solve numerically the
single optimisation problem, as it is out of the scope of the present paper.
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be suitable for different lines of product-specific policies. As a new side-effect result
of our approach, when it is compared with the linear aggregation limitation in [16],
we still prove the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium strategy when the aggregate is
non-linear. This is novel result from a game-theoretic perspective. Furthermore, from
the point of view of actuarial science, the pure Nash equilibrium existence of a con-
structed insurance game with a non-convex strategy set is obtained.2 That is, insurers
can avoid any premium range that is not preferred to price. We solve the insurance
game with respect to two distinct insurance models by calculating the best-response
equations system. The numerical result for a 12-player insurance game is presented
under the assumption that the best-response selection premium strategies always give
the global maximum value of the corresponding payoff function.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the
formation of two insurance market competition models and constructs the game. In
Section 2.3, the existence of a Nash equilibrium is proved using potential game tech-
niques. Section 2.4 presents the simulation results of two models in a 12-insurer game.
2.2 Modelling Formulation and Preliminaries
2.2.1 Basic Notations and Assumptions
In this subsection, the necessary notation is provided and appropriate assumptions are
introduced. Thus, in the next lines, the definition of key parameters is concentrated for
a better understanding of the remaining paper:
2It is true that since we are able to extend the results of [16] for a non-linear aggregation, the concept
of our model is possible to be used in other fields of economics. For this comment, we would like
cordially to thank one of our reviewers who pointed this out to us. However, further discussion falls
out of the scope of this paper, since various parameters from the relevant actuarial science literature are
incorporated in the construction of our insurance model [54, 55, 25, 41, 42, 43].
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N Set of insurers in the insurance market, N = {1, . . . , n}, n ∈ N;
ai Price sensitivity (positive) parameter of insurer i ∈ N ;
h1, h2 Market presence limit factor, which controls the amount of the flow of insur-
ance policies attributable to the competition in the market;
p1i Premium value (per unit of exposure) for insurer i ∈ N at time t = 1;
Pi Set of strategies for insurer i ∈ N ;
P Set of joint strategies for all insurers in the competitive market;
p Arbitrary profile inP;
p1−i Strategy profile of other players at time t = 1, {P 11 , . . . , P 1i−1, P 1i+1, . . . , P 1n};
q1i Exposure (volume of business) for insurer i ∈ N at time t = 1, which
represents the number (quantity) of policies undertaken by i ∈ N ;
∆q1i Marginal difference of exposure volume for insurer i ∈ N at time t = 1;
qˆ1i Actual (number of policies) volume of exposure in the market coming to in-
surer i ∈ N at time t = 1 from the unallocated exposure at time t = 0;
qˆ0i Given number of policies in the market, which is intended to flow in or away
from insurer i ∈ N at time t = 1 from the unallocated exposure of time
t = 0;
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u1i Utility of insurer i at time t = 1, which represents the net income of insurer
i ∈ N at time t = 1, depends on insurer i’s premium and the aggregate of
other players’ strategies;
σi Interacting function, which represents the interaction between insurer i’s
payoff with the others in the market;
x1−i Parameter indicating the aggregation of p
1
−i;
αi Cost ratio of holding wealth of i ∈ N , generally higher than the risk-free
rate, αi ∈ (0, 1);
pi1i Expected breakeven premium (per unit of exposure) for insurer i ∈ N at time
t = 1, i.e., expectation of future claims plus other expenses. However, for
purposes of simplicity, we skip the word ”expected” when we refer to the
breakeven premium in the remaining paper;
ki Breakeven ratio for insurer i ∈ N , ki is equal to pi1i divided by p1i ;
θ1 Market stability factor, which is used to describe the market’s condition;
βi Best-response correspondences for insurer i regarding all the other players’
strategies;
Ri Best-response correspondences for insurer i regarding x1−i;
rˆi The maximal selections of Ri;
Before we proceed further, the following general assumption is proposed.
Assumption 1: In the insurance market, for any insurer i ∈ N at time t = 1,
• The breakeven premium (per unit of exposure) pi1i is assumed to be less than the
corresponding premium p1i .
• Both pi1i and p1i are positive quantities.
Entries of new insurers and insurance products are not taken into consideration.
Insurers avoid to set premium under cost level [54, 55, 25, 41, 42, 43], and see the
references therein. Thus, the case that p1i ≤ pi1i is not considered in this paper.
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2.2.2 Insurance Premium Pricing Model
For the proposed insurance model, every insurer must maximise its wealth. In this di-
rection, a two-period framework: t = 0, 1 is investigated in a general insurance market.
In line with the previous literature (see Section 2.1), the utility function u1i that concerns
insurer i with initial wealth u0i is formulated as follows,
u1i = −αiu0i + (1− αi)(p1i − pi1i )q1i . (2.1)
For insurer i, pi is the premium value per unit of exposure; qi represents the holding
exposure volume; pii denotes the breakeven premium per unit of exposure, which in-
cludes risk premium and other expenses. pi, qi, pii are all positive and αi ∈ (0, 1) is a
given parameter that refers to the cost ratio of holding insurer i’s wealth. As shown in
Eq. (2.1), the net income of any insurer i is regarded as its utility u1i , and each insurer
is assumed to receive the premium from policyholders at the beginning of time t = 1.
We also assume that the insurance market contains N = {1, . . . , n} insurers, and each
insurer has perfect knowledge of its previous information. Moreover, p0i , q
0
i , pi
0
i , u
0
i are
all known as constants at time t = 1. What is more, the value of q1i implies competition
in the market and must be determined analytically. An insurer’s change in the number
of policies is related to the deviation in the insurer’s premium which is also connected to
the market’s premium level [13]. With the purpose of investigating exposure changes,
marginal difference of exposure volume ∆q1i is defined in Eq. (2.2)
∆q1i = q
1
i − q0i . (2.2)
We define the total market exposure Q1m > 0 at time t = 1 as [22] did, which
contains two components. The first part was related to the sum of the current exposure
for each insurance company, i.e., Q1 =
∑
i∈N q
1
i > 0, and the second part had to do
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with the available (unallocated) exposure in the market, Qˆ1, thus
Q1m = Q
1 + Qˆ1.
Qˆ1 is allowed to be negative, and Qˆ1 ≤ Q1m. Policyholders may stop renewing policies
at the end of time t = 0, and new clients may buy policies at the beginning of time
t = 1 to become new policyholders. Consequently, Q1 cannot be equal to Q0, which
causes the sum of all insurers’ exposure change
∑
i∈N ∆q
1
i to take any value in R. In
our approach, instead of simply applying the demand function as it was the current trend
(see the references in Section 2.1), the competition between any pair of insurers is now
considered. Thus, additionally, the interaction between insurers’ premiums needs to be
formulated; consequently, ∆q1i is further analysed.
In the following two subsections, two distinct insurance models are introduced: a)
the simple exposure difference model I (GI), where
∑
i∈N ∆q
1
i might take any value in
R and the available (unallocated) exposure of the insurance market Qˆ1 is under consid-
eration; b) the advanced exposure difference model II (GII), which is used to further
analyse policies for any insurer. Both models investigate the competition under the fol-
lowing assumption.
Let us define the transfer function ρ from insurer j to insurer i at time t = 1 as fol-
lows
ρ1j→i = 1−
p0j
p0i
p1i
p1j
. (2.3)
The transfer function ρ1j→i in Eq. (2.3) describes that, for time t = 1, when the quotient
of insurer i’s premium and the previous premium p
1
i
p0i
is less than j’s quotient
p1j
p0j
, insurer
j’s policies tend to flow to insurer i. The exposure of insurer i increases in the competi-
tion with j, whereas the exposure of j decreases. Policies flow in a reverse manner and
p1i
p0i
>
p1j
p0j
.
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This assumption indicates that the preference of policyholders, i.e., when one in-
surer increases its premium and its competitor decreases its own premium, the insurer
simultaneously decreases its attractiveness. When both insurers increase their premiums
by different percentages, the insurer with the smaller increment becomes more attrac-
tive. Finally, in a similar manner, when both decrease their premiums, the insurer with
the larger decrement becomes more attractive.
Insurer i gains exposure from the competition with insurer j when it offers a more
attractive premium. However, policyholders sometimes choose an insurer’s policies
with higher premiums as the most preferable one because of a better reputation [42]
(and the references therein). For this reason, the percentage changes in the premium are
adapted in the transfer function rather than in the value of the premium itself. Note that
the transfer function ρ1i→j can be either positive or negative. The policy amount of i is
increased when ρ1i→j > 0 and reduced when ρ
1
i→j < 0.
By investigating the flow of policies between any pair of insurers, the entire in-
surance market competition can be evaluated by aggregating every competition among
the different pairs of insurers. This topic is the focus of discussion in the following
subsections.
Simple Exposure Difference Model I (GI)
Let us consider that the competition in the insurance market is formulated as follows.
First, the premium levels vary over time, which might even cause a change in the total
number of policies in the market. Second, potential clients consider holding insurance
policies when premiums decline. In contrast, the insurance market may lose clients if
the market premium level is high.
In GI , we assume that for any pair of insurers i and j, exposure qi – which is related
to gain or loss – is not equal to exposure qj – which has to do with loss or gain –
respectively. Thus, this assumption indicates that the available exposure joins or leaves
the market because of competition between i and j. The expected exposure to flow by
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insurer i attributable to competition with j is given by
q1j→i = h1aiρ
1
j→iq
0
i (2.4)
6= −q1i→j, h1 > 0.
Here, we define ai as the price sensitivity (positive) parameter of insurer i and h1 as the
market presence limit factor in GI .
The exposure gain or loss from all other insurers to i is given by
∆q1i =
∑
j∈N
q1j→i. (2.5)
Eqs. (2.4)–(2.5) are interpreted as follows. The strength (which is related to either gain
or loss) of the exposure of insurer i attributable to the competition with j is demon-
strated in Eq. (2.4). The premium p1j is modelled as being transferred to insurer i’s
premium by multiplying p
0
i
p0j
in ρ1i→j for the purpose of simultaneously comparing two
insurers’ premiums. Insurer i’s price sensitivity parameter ai is considered as informa-
tion of insurer i for presenting the market power. Note that, regarding the transferred
premium p
0
i
p0j
p1j as i’s previous premium p
0
i , the item aiρ
1
j→iq
0
i is just the volume of busi-
ness i’s gain or loss when the price elasticity is ai. In our case, the price elasticity of
demand, ai, is determined by imitating the concept of the [35] index, i.e., the leader in
the insurance market which has the larger market power has lower price sensitivity and
so on and so forth. In a competitive market, q1i depends not only on p
1
i but also on other
insurers’ premiums. Hence, instead of comparing the previous premium p0i , the trans-
ferred premium p
0
i
p0j
p1j is adopted to characterise the change in the volume of polices. In
Eq. (2.4), h1 is the market presence limit factor, which is used to limit the scale of the
policies’ flow amount. Because different stabilities exist in various insurance markets,
h1 can take different positive values.
The exposure difference ∆q1i from the competition in the entire market is obtained
by summing up all of the policies’ gains or losses when competing with all insurers.
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Note that
∑
i∈N ∆q
1
i is allowed not to be equal to zero. Regarding Eqs. (2.1)–(2.5), the
utility function can be deduced.
We define u1GI ,i (similar for u
1
GII ,i
, see Subsection 2.2.2) be the utility functions of
insurer i at time t = 1 in GI (GII).
Lemma 2.1. For the simple exposure difference model I, the utility function u1GI ,i of
insurer i at time t = 1 is given by
u1GI ,i = −
aih1q
0
i (1− αi)
p0i
(
∑
j∈N
p0j
p1j
)(p1i )
2
+ (1− αi)[q0i + nh1aiq0i + pi1i (
∑
j∈N
p0j
p1j
)
aih1q
0
i
p0i
]p1i
− αiu0i − pi1i (1− αi)[q0i + naih1q0i ]. (2.6)
Proof. By combining Eqs. (2.2)–(2.5), we obtain the exposure of i considering that the
competition occurred at time t = 1.
q1i = q
0
i + ∆q
1
i
= q0i +
∑
j∈N
h1aiρ
1
j→iq
0
i
= q0i +
∑
j∈N
h1aiq
0
i (1−
p0j
p0i
p1i
p1j
)
= q0i + nh1aiq
0
i −
aih1q
0
i p
1
i
p0i
∑
j∈N
p0j
p1j
.
By taking q1i above into Eq. (2.1), we have that
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u1GI ,i = −αiu0i + (1− αi)(p1i − pi1i )(q0i + nh1aiq0i
−aih1q
0
i p
1
i
p0i
∑
j∈N
p0j
p1j
)
= −aih1q
0
i (1− αi)
p0i
(
∑
j∈N
p0j
p1j
)(p1i )
2
+ (1− αi)[q0i + nh1aiq0i + pi1i (
∑
j∈N
p0j
p1j
)
aih1q
0
i
p0i
]p1i
− αiu0i − pi1i (1− αi)[q0i + naih1q0i ].
Advanced Exposure Difference Model II (GII)
The modified exposure for insurer i can be further analysed. Different from GI , in GII ,
we concretely characterize the two components mentioned in Subsection 2.2.2, i.e., a)
reallocated policies of the previous market Q0, and b) policies from the (unallocated)
exposure Qˆ1.
Regarding the competition between any pair of insurers i and j, the number of ex-
change policies is characterised. The exposure gain or loss from i to j is obtained with
respect to both insurers’ premium strategy and market power. Given a positive market
presence limit factor h2, the strength of the flow of business between i and j is modelled
as follows
q1j→i = h2(aiρ
1
j→iq
0
i − ajρ1i→jq0j ) (2.7)
= −q1i→j, h2 > 0.
As demonstrated in Eq. (2.7), both exposure i which tended to a gain or loss, aiρ1j→iq
0
i ,
and exposure j which showed a potential loss or gain, −ajρ1i→jq0j , represent the ex-
change strength from summing up the volume. The volume of the flow of exposure is
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further governed by h2, which is defined as the positive market presence limit factor in
GII . Note that
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N q
1
j→i equals to zero because of policies exchange between
insurers in the component a). In the same way, for the b) component, the potential flow
of policies, either attract or withdraw from the unallocated insurance market Qˆ1, and it
is modelled as h2ai(1− p
1
i
p0i
θ1)q0i .
The flow of policies from the unallocated insurance market is modelled similarly to
the concept of price elasticity: a comparison with previous premium price. Apart from
the competition between pairs of insurers, they tend to lose policies to the available
market when increasing their premiums and gain policies by lowering them. In addition,
a positive market stability factor θ1 is adopted to describe the market condition: θ1 = 1
indicates that the market faces a general condition; the insurance industry expands when
θ1 < 1 because more policies tend to flow into the industry from the unallocated market;
θ1 > 1, when the market faces a situation with challenges. Overall, the exposure gain
or loss for i is given by
∆q1i =
∑
j∈N
q1j→i + h2ai(1−
p1i
p0i
θ1)q0i , θ
1 > 0. (2.8)
Following Assumption 1, ki ∈ (0, 1). Then, the objective function for the GII case
can be deduced.
Lemma 2.2. For the advanced exposure difference model II, the utility function u1GII ,i
of insurer i at time t = 1 is given by
u1GII ,i = −
(1− ki)(1− αi)h2aiq0i
p0i
(
∑
j∈N
p0j
p1j
+ θ1)(p1i )
2
+ (1− ki)(1− αi)(q0i + (n+ 1)h2aiq0i − h2
∑
j∈N
ajq
0
j )p
1
i
+ (1− ki)(1− αi)h2p0i
∑
j∈N
ajq
0
j
p1j
p0j
− αiu0i . (2.9)
Proof. Using Eqs. (2.7)–(2.8) instead, Lemma 2.2 can be showed similarly as Lemma
2.1.
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In the next Subsection, the construction of the game is presented and further dis-
cussed.
2.2.3 Game Construction
Normal Form Game
Let us define an N -insurer game, G, in a two-period framework: t = 0, 1. Each insurer
i’s strategy at time t = 1 is p1i , which stands for the action setting premium as the
value of p1i , whereas Pi is the set of strategies. We use P˜ 1i to denote the equilibrium
strategy for insurer i. Insurer i’s payoff function is defined as u1i : P → R, where
P ≡ P1 × · · · × PN and p is an arbitrary profile in P . The notation p1−i ∈ P−i
stands for {p11, . . . , p1i−1, p1i+1, . . . , p1n}, which is used to represent the strategy profile of
other players at time t. (p1i , p
1
−i) ∈ P decomposes a strategy profile in two parts, the
insurer i’s strategy and other insurers’ components. Given this game in the insurance
market, instead of calculating the optimal premium that maximises a single insurer’s
wealth, as was the case in the previous literature (see Section 2.1 for further details), the
calculation of the Nash equilibrium is targeted.
Generally, from a game theory perspective, the Nash equilibrium is a prediction
strategy that dictates the choices that each insurer is willing to make. Given the opti-
mal strategy profile of other insurers, the market reaches a Nash equilibrium when no
insurer can increase its total payoff by changing its strategy. The Nash equilibrium is
defined through the best-response correspondences. In what it follows the next defini-
tions should be stated.
Definition 2.3. [28] Define βi by
βi(p
1
−i) = {p1i ∈ Pi : u1i (p1i , p1−i) ≥ u1i (p´1i , p1−i),∀p´1i ∈ Pi}.
We call βi the best-response correspondences for insurer i.
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For any choice p−i ∈ P−i of others’ strategies at time t, the set βi(p1−i) of best
replies of insurer i is given by
βi(p
1
−i) = argmax
p1i∈Pi
u1i (p
1
i , p
1
−i).
Each player’s predicted strategy must be a best response to the predicted strategies
of the other players as the market reaches a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.4. [28] A strategy profile, p˜1, is a Nash equilibrium of the game (at time
t) if and only if each player’s strategy is a best response to the other players’ strategies.
That is
p˜1i ∈ β(p˜1−i), ∀i ∈ N.
The best-response potential game technique is further considered, which is widely
used to prove the existence of Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.5. [60] A strategic game G˜ =< (βi,Pi)i∈N > is a best-response potential
game if there exists a function f :P → R such that
∀i ∈ N,∀p−i ∈P−i : βi(p−i) = argmax
pi∈Pi
f(pi, p−i).
The function f is called a best-response potential function of the game G˜.
The potential function f offers a new approach to determining the Nash equilibrium
for the game G˜ by maximising f . Note that, f is a function, which depends on every
insurer’s strategy. If f has a maximum overP , G˜ has a Nash equilibrium. A specific
type of game, known as an aggregate game, is introduced to solve the Nash equilibrium
for the N insurers’ game.
Aggregate Games
With the additional requirement that each insurer’s payoff is written as a function that
depends only on its own strategy and an aggregate of the full strategy profile, a normal
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form game can be transformed into a game with aggregation. Formally, we have the
following definition.
Definition 2.6. [37] An aggregate game in the insurance market,G′ =< (Pi, u1i )i∈N , g >,
is a normal form game with an extra condition that there exists an aggregate function,
g(p1) : P −→ M ⊆ R, such that each player’s payoff function can be further spe-
cialised to the aggregate form
p1 7→ u1i (p1i , g(p1)),
where M1 ∈M, is called an aggregator of p1.
The only requirement for a game to represent an aggregate game is that there exists
an aggregate function [2]. To construct an insurance game with aggregation, a mean-
ingful monotone aggregate function g is expected to be obtained. Here, the Insurance
Game I, equipped with the objective function in the simple exposure difference model
I, and the Insurance Game II, implemented with the objective function in the advanced
exposure difference model II, are considered. Before we proceed further, the definitions
of GI and GII are given as follows.
Definition 2.7. A game GI =< (PGI ,i, u1GI ,i)i∈N > has a finite set of players N , with
compact, positive, pure strategy set PGI ,i with respect to every i, whereas u1GI ,i in Eq.
(2.6) is the payoff function for i at time t = 1. This type of game is called Insurance
Game I.
Similarly, Insurance Game II is defined as GII =< (PGII ,i, u1GII ,i)i∈N >, with player
set N , compact, positive, pure strategy set PGII ,i and payoff function u1GII ,i in Eq. (2.9).
2.3 Main Results
In this section, the theoretical results for models GI and GII are presented. However,
before we proceed further with the existence of a Nash equilibrium, it is necessary to
show that both GI and GII are aggregate games.
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Lemma 2.8. Based on the definition of payoff functions stated in the previous section,
both GI and GII are aggregate games.
Proof. Denote M1 =
∑
j∈N
p0j
p1j
as the aggregation of GI game. Then, the payoff func-
tion in Eq. (2.6) turns out to be
u1GI ,i = −
aih1q
0
i (1− αi)
p0i
M1(p1i )
2 + (1− αi)[q0i + nh1aiq0i + pi1iM1
aih1q
0
i
p0i
]p1i
− αiu0i − pi1i (1− αi)[q0i + naih1q0i ].
There exists an aggregate function g(p1) =
∑
j∈N
p0j
p1j
in GI . For GII game, we further
denote m1 =
∑
j∈N ajq
0
j
p1j
p0j
as the other aggregation. Similarly, we obtain the payoff,
u1GII ,i = −
(1− ki)(1− αi)h2aiq0i
p0i
(m1 + θ1)(p1i )
2
+ (1− ki)(1− αi)(q0i + (n+ 1)h2aiq0i − h2
∑
j∈N
ajq
0
j )p
1
i
+ (1− ki)(1− αi)h2p0im1 − αiu0i .
Thus, the statement of the Lemma is derived.
In aggregate games, for every player i, the other players in the competitive market
are considered as a single player because their strategies aggregate through an interact-
ing function σi :P−i → X−i ⊆ R. Intuitively, the other players influence i through the
interaction function σi(p1−i). X−i = σi(P−i) is set to indicate the range of σi, whereas
x1−i = σi(p
1
−i) ∈ X−i for any t. With x1−i =
∑
j 6=i
p0j
p1j
, respectively, the GI and GII
payoff functions are given as follows:
u1GI ,i = −
aih1q
0
i (1− αi)
p0i
x1−i(p
1
i )
2
+ (1− αi)[q0i + (n− 1)h1aiq0i + pi1i x1−i
aih1q
0
i
p0i
]p1i
− αiu0i − pi1i (1− αi)[q0i + (n− 1)aih1q0i ]
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and
u1GII ,i = −
(1− ki)(1− αi)h2aiq0i
p0i
(x1−i + θ
1)(p1i )
2
+ (1− ki)(1− αi)(q0i + nh2aiq0i − h2
∑
j 6=i
ajq
0
j )p
1
i
+ (1− ki)(1− αi)h2p0i
∑
j 6=i
ajq
0
j
p1j
p0j
− αiu0i .
To generate Nash equilibrium premium strategies, Ri : X−i → 2Pi , we need to define
Ri(x
1
−i) = argmax
p1i∈P
u1i (p
1
i , x
1
−i),
which coincides with βi(p1−i). In other words, Ri describes how the interaction param-
eter x1−i = σi(p
1
−i) influences insurer i’s best-response strategy.
In the case of GI , we have
RGI ,i(x
1
−i) = argmax
p1i∈P
u1GI ,i(p
1
i , x
1
−i). (2.10)
rˆGI ,i is defined as the maximal selections of RGI ,i(x
1
−i), and for GII , we have
RGII ,i(x
1
−i) = argmax
p1i∈P
u1GII ,i(p
1
i , x
1
−i). (2.11)
rˆGII ,i is defined as the maximal selections of RGII ,i(x
1
−i).
Before we prove that both GI and GII are best-response potential games, we need
to recall first, Lemma 2.9 which is proposed by [30].
Lemma 2.9. The game < (βi,Pi)i∈N > is a best-response potential game if and only if
there exists a real-valued function, f :→ R, such that:
p˜1  p1 ⇒ f(p˜1) ≥ f(p1) (2.12)
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and
p˜1  p1 ⇒ f(p˜1) > f(p1), (2.13)
where the previous two binary relations are defined as:
p˜1  p1 ⇔ ∃i ∈ N, s.t. [p˜1−i = p1−i, and p˜1i ∈ Ri(x1−i)]
p˜1  p1 ⇔ [p˜1  p1, and p1−i /∈ Ri(x1−i)]
The next lemma is useful for the main result of our paper. Its proof is rather techni-
cal, and for better understanding, we present it using intermediate steps.
Lemma 2.10. Both GI and GII are best-response potential games.
Proof. Initially, GI is considered.
• Step 1: State the best-response potential function.
– Convex hull of X−i.
In the case that Pi is not convex, X−i is not convex as well. Denote Σ−i as
the convex hull of X−i, which is obviously compact.
For GI , RGI ,i is the best-response correspondences to x
1
−i of i. We ex-
tend RGI ,i in a piecewise linear fashion to ΦGI ,i, defined on the domain Σ−i.
ΦGI ,i coincides with RGI ,i on X−i. For any s ∈ Σ−i \ X−i define
ΦGI ,i(s) =
z − s
z − yRGI ,i(y) +
s− y
z − yRGI ,i(z),
with y = max{v ∈ X−i|v ≤ s} and z = min{v ∈ X−i|v ≥ s}.
– For any insurer i, linearly enhance the best response domain to be the
same as its strategy domain.
Let PˆGI ,i denote the range of player i’s best response map, and the set be
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{p1i ∈ PGI ,i : p1i ∈ Ri(σi(p1−i))} ⊆ PGI ,i. Denote φ1GI ,i as the selections of
ΦGI ,i, which is continuous on Σ−i. We further define a mapping Oi(φ
1
GI ,i
),
which linearly enhances the domain PˆGI ,i to PGI ,i. In addition, r1GI ,i is de-
fined as the selection of Oi(φ1GI ,i). In other words,
∀i,∃xˆ1−i s.t. p1i ∈ Oi(ΦGI ,i(xˆ1−i)).
Let ⊥1i = minp1−i∈P1−i σi(p1−i), >1i = maxp1−i∈P1−i σi(p1−i), and extend each
r1GI ,i to [⊥1i ,>1i ] along the line with [31].
– We state that the following Eq. (2.14) is the best-response potential func-
tion of GI .
f(p1i , p
1
−i) =
∑
i
[
p0i
∫ >1i
⊥1i
min{− 1
p1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ − p
0
i
p1i
⊥i
]
+
∑
i<j
p0i p
0
j
p1i p
1
j
.
(2.14)
• Step 2: Prove that Eqs. (2.12) and (2.13) are true.
– Prove that each of the correspondences RGI ,i : X−i → 2Pi is a strictly
decreasing selection; that is, for every Ri, all x1−i ∈ X−i such that
Ri(x¯
1
−i) > Ri(x
1
−i) whenever x¯1−i ≤ x1−i.
The statement is satisfied as long as the conditions of Topkis’ Theorem (see
[59] for details) are satisfied, i.e. each Pi is a lattice, every uGI ,i(p1i , x1−i)
supermodular in p1i ,and has strictly decreasing differences in p
1
i and x
1
−i.
Since p1i is one-dimensional for all i, the first two of these requirements are
satisfied: Pi is a lattice for all i; every uGI ,i supermodular in p1i . In addition,
because u1i is twice differentiable, uGI ,i(p
1
i , x
1
−i) has strictly decreasing dif-
ferences in p1i and x
1
−i if and only if ∂
2uGI ,i(p
1
i , x
1
−i)/∂p
1
i∂x
1
−i < 0. In an
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insurance game GI , we have
∂2uGI ,i(p
1
i , x
1
−i)/∂x
1
−i∂p
1
i = ∂{−2
(1− αi)h1aiq0i
p0i
x1−ip
1
i + (1− αi)[q0i
+ (n− 1)h1aiq0i + pi1i x1−i
aih1q
0
i
p0i
]}/∂x1−i
=
aih1q
0
i (1− αi)
p0i
(pi1i − 2p1i ) < 0.
According to the assumption that for any i, t, pi1i < p
1
i , the above item is
negative. Hence, u1i (p
1
i , x
1
−i) has strictly decreasing differences in p
1
i and
x1−i. Because Oi(φ
1
GI ,i
) enhance the domain PˆGI ,i linearly, r1GI ,i coincides
with φ1GI ,i. One can deduce that if xˆ
1
−i > x
1
−i, we have p
1
i < p˜
1
i and vice
versa.
– The comparison between f(p˜1i , p1−i) and f(p1i , p1−i).
With equilibrium premium p˜1i of i in p˜
1, the difference between f(p˜1) and
f(p1) is demonstrated as
f(p˜1i , p
1
−i)− f(p1i , p1−i)
=
∑
i∈N
[∫ >1i
⊥1i
p0i ·min{−
1
p˜1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ
]
−
∑
i∈N
[∫ >1i
⊥1i
p0i ·min{−
1
p1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ
]
−
∑
i∈N
[
p0i
p˜1i
· ⊥1i
]
+
∑
i∈N
[
p0i
p1i
· ⊥1i
]
+
[
p0i
p˜1i
− p
0
i
p1i
]
·
∑
j 6=i
p0j
p1j
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=
∫ >1i
⊥1i
p0i ·min{−
1
p˜1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ −
∫ >1i
⊥1i
p0i ·min{−
1
p1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ
−p
0
i
p˜1i
· ⊥1i +
p0i
p1i
· ⊥1i +
p0i
p˜1i
· x1−i −
p0i
p1i
· x1−i
= p0i
[∫ >1i
⊥1i
min{− 1
p˜1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ −
∫ >1i
⊥1i
min{− 1
p1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ
−
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p˜1i
dτ +
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p1i
dτ
]
.
When xˆ1−i > x
1
−i,
f(P˜ 1i , p
1
−i)− f(p1i , p1−i)
=
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
min{− 1
p˜1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ +
∫ xˆ1−i
x1−i
min{− 1
p˜1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ
+
∫ >1i
xˆ1−i
min{− 1
p˜1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ −
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
min{− 1
p1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ
−
∫ xˆ1−i
x1−i
min{− 1
p1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ −
∫ >1i
xˆ1−i
min{− 1
p1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ
−
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p˜1i
dτ +
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p1i
dτ
=
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p˜1i
dτ +
∫ xˆ1−i
x1−i
− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
dτ +
∫ >1i
xˆ1−i
− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
dτ
−
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p1i
dτ −
∫ xˆ1−i
x1−i
− 1
p1i
dτ −
∫ >1i
xˆ1−i
− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
dτ
−
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p˜1i
dτ +
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p1i
dτ
=
∫ xˆ1−i
x1−i
[
1
p1i
− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
]dτ > 0.
When xˆ1−i < x
1
−i,
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f(P˜ 1i , p
1
−i)− f(p1i , p1−i)
=
∫ xˆ1−i
⊥1i
min{− 1
p˜1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ +
∫ x1−i
xˆ1−i
min{− 1
p˜1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ
+
∫ >1i
x1−i
min{− 1
p˜1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ −
∫ xˆ1−i
⊥1i
min{− 1
p1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ
−
∫ x1−i
xˆ1−i
min{− 1
p1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ −
∫ >1i
x1−i
min{− 1
p1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ
−
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p˜1i
dτ +
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p1i
dτ
=
∫ xˆ1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p˜1i
dτ +
∫ x1−i
xˆ1−i
− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
dτ +
∫ >1i
x1−i
− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
dτ
−
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p1i
dτ −
∫ xˆ1−i
x1−i
− 1
p1i
dτ −
∫ >1i
xˆ1−i
− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
dτ
−
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p˜1i
dτ +
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p1i
dτ
=
∫ x1−i
xˆ1−i
[
1
r1GI ,i(τ)
− 1
p1i
]dτ > 0.
It is obvious that if xˆ1−i = x
1
−i, this item equals zero. In this case, p
1
i , p˜
1
i ∈
RGI ,i(σi(p
1
−i)) (i.e. if Eq. (2.12) holds but not Eq. (2.13)), f(P˜
1
i , p
1
−i) −
f(p1i , p
1
−i) = 0. Eq. (2.12) is proved to be true in an insurance game GI . If
not, Eq. (2.13) is proved.
• Step 3: Conclusion
We conclude that when (p1i , p
1
−i), (p˜
1
i , p
1
−i) ∈ Pi,(p˜1i , p1−i)  ()(p1i , p1−i) ⇒
f(p˜1i , p
1
−i)− f(p1i , p1−i) ≥ (>)0, with respect to Lemma 2.10. An insurance game
G1 is the best-response potential game, whereas f is the best-response potential
function.
Similarly, in GII ,
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∂2u1GII ,i(p
1
i , x
1
−i)/∂x
1
−i∂p
1
i = ∂{−2
(1− αi)(1− ki)h2aiq0i
p0i
(x1−i + θ
1)p1i
+(1− ki)(1− αi)(q0i + nh2aiq0i − h2
∑
j 6=i
ajq
0
j )}/∂x1−i
= −2(1− αi)(1− ki)h2aiq
0
i
p0i
p1i < 0.
We also obtain that u1GII ,i(p
1
i , x
1
−i) has strictly decreasing differences in p
1
i and x
1
−i.
By replacing r1GI ,i by r
1
GII ,i
in f from Eq. (2.14), one obtains the best-response potential
function of u1GII ,i in GII .
Following the discussion so far, one can deduce the useful Theorem, which is the
main theoretical result of our paper.
Theorem 2.11. The Nash equilibrium at time t = 1 in both GI and GII exists.
Proof. In GI , let us suppose that
p˜1 ∈ argmax f(p1i , p1−i).
Such a p˜1 exists because Pi is compact for any i and f is continuous. If p˜1 is not a
Nash equilibrium of G1, then f(c1i , p˜
1
−i) > f(p˜
1) for some c1i ∈ Pi, contradicting that
p˜1 maximises f . Hence, the Nash equilibrium exists in GI . Similarly, it can be shown
that the Nash equilibrium exists in GII .
2.4 Numerical Example
In this section, a numerical example with 12 major non-life insurance companies based
on the number of contracts (i.e., volume of business) they have in their portfolios is
proposed to illustrate the main modelling characteristics and theoretical findings of our
paper. A scenario which investigates insurers with different market power is considered
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by consisting of a market leading insurer with 796, 139 contracts, nine almost equal
insurers with around 300, 000 contracts and two followers with only around 200, 000
contracts.3 Referring to the premium values at time t = 0, the pricing strategy for the
entire market of insurers is derived by finding the Nash equilibrium premiums at time
t = 1. The impact of different parameters involved in the process to the equilibrium
premiums is also analysed. To generate results that are comparable to those existing in
the literature of actuarial science and for simplicity in our calculations, convex premium
strategy sets are considered in the numerical example.4
Insurance Companies Premium Number of Contracts Price sensitivity
parameter
i p0i q
0
i ai
1 e269.09 298,269 2.0
2 e282.07 303,673 2.0
3 e377.06 282,224 2.0
4 e371.52 304,609 2.0
5 e281.56 295,769 2.0
6 e377.83 796,139 1.9
7 e257.88 298,304 2.0
8 e366.99 200,135 2.1
9 e347.58 211,314 2.1
10 e351.18 299,690 2.0
11 e364.11 299,995 2.0
12 e291.22 319,453 2.0
TABLE 2.1: 12 insurance companies are considered from the Greek insurance mar-
ket in 2010. Premium values and number of contracts are based on data from the
Hellenic Association of Insurance Companies. Price sensitivity parameter for every
insurer demonstrated in the table is used as a benchmark.
Data is used from the Greek market, as it was presented in [41, 43]. Thus, the
premium prices are calculated in Euros. Let us assume that the number of contracts at
time t = 0 is demonstrated in Table 2.1. With respect to t, this dataset is adopted for
a 12-player game because the insurers’ premium prices and exposure in the previous
3We don’t have here any intention to develop any type of Stackelberg leadership model. However, the
Greek insurance market might be considered as an ideal case for this model. Thus, it will be considered
as a future work.
4We recall that the theoretical results did not assume any type of convexity.
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period are used. With an intention to describe insurance companies’ market power, the
price sensitivity parameter, ai, for all insurers i is characterised further.
The standard values of price sensitivity parameter are set up in Table 2.1, and they
can be used as a benchmark. As it was already demonstrated, insurer 6 is considered
to be the market leader with the lowest price sensitivity parameter a6 = 1.9, because it
occupies significant greater market weight compared with other insurers. Correspond-
ingly, insurers 8 and 9 are regarded as market followers, which have price sensitivity
parameters of value 2.1. All of the others insurers’ price sensitivity parameter take the
value of 2.0 in our insurance game.5
The diversity of the price sensitivity parameter for the insurers obviously affect the
equilibrium premium profiles. Different values of ai are investigated through a simu-
lation. However, for any i, a1i are restricted in [1.5, 2.5]. Using the previously demon-
strated market data, the Nash equilibrium premium profiles are calculated for both GI
and GII .
2.4.1 Insurance Game I Simulation Results
In Insurance Game I, GI , the Nash equilibrium premium profiles are calculated with
respect to the market’s data at time t = 0; see Table 2.1. Table 2.2 sets up also ad hoc
the main parameters. Note that for any insurer i in G1, the breakeven premium pi1i is not
assumed to be proportional to p1i . The percentage between pi
1
i and p
1
i is used to describe
the cost structure of i.
Number of market participants n 12
Market presence limit factor h1 0.09
The breakeven ratio of every insurer ki 0.5
TABLE 2.2: Environmental parameter values in GI
From Eq. (2.6), the second order condition of payoff is negative for each insurer i
in GI . Hence, when the stationary point is in the domain PGI ,i, i’s payoff is maximized.
5The values for ai have been considered ad hoc based on the concept of [35] index. Unfortunately,
we don’t have access to more detailed data, and some of the model parameters are rather artificial. This
is common in the corresponding literature [25, 24]
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What is more, one can find out the Nash equilibrium profiles by implementing the fol-
lowing algorithm:
Step 1: For each insurer i, set the first order condition of its payoff function equal to
zero as the maximum selection(s). From Eq. (2.10),
rˆGI ,i :
1 + (n− 1)h1ai + pi1i x1−i aih1p0i
2h1aix1−i
p0i = 0.
Step 2: Solve the system of r1GI ,i.
Step 3: Select the profile(s) corresponding to each insurer’s premium located in PGI ,i,
which is (are) the Nash equilibrium premium profile(s).
Be aware that when the derived values are located outside of PGI ,i, then these are not the
equilibrium premiums, as the edges of the premium domain reach a maximum instead.
Furthermore, it indicates that the Nash equilibrium still exists even though the calculated
premium profile have not located inside of PGI ,i. However, this case won’t be analysed
further here.
Let us now characterize the premium strategies set PGI ,i. For each insurer i, the
premiums are restricted to take values between e180 and e800 during any period, i.e.,
p1i ∈ [e180,e800]. In addition the other parameters are restrained, i.e., the market pres-
ence limit factor h1 ∈ [0.07, 0.11] and the breakeven premium pi1i ∈ [30%p1i , 70%p1i ],
for any i, t. Numerical results for the system of equations r1GI ,i are generated using m-
file ”fsolve”. It should be mentioned that the Nash equilibrium premium profile might
not be unique. However, among these results we chose the first positive premium profile
which located in PGI ,i.6 This result is illustrated in Figure 2.1. Figure 2.2 shows the
corresponding number of contracts from insurers 1 to 12.
The ratio between insurers’ equilibrium premiums at time t = 1 is correlative to
the previous premium ratio in Figure 2.1. Note that the market leader insurer 6 tends
to increase its premium, which leads to a reduction of its policy numbers in Figure 2.2.
6Among all the possible positive profiles, we pick up the smallest one based on the iterative algorithm
of the Matlab, m-file ”fsolve”.
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Larger market power offers insurer 6 the advantage in competition, which allows it to
increase its premium until equilibrium for seeking higher profit.
Figure 2.3 demonstrates the effect of the increasing parameter pi16 in GI . In Figure
2.3, adjustment for a single insurer’s breakeven premium ratio is investigated. The
market leader, insurer 6, is modelled to increase pi16 from 30% to 70% of p
1
i , whereas
all other insurers keep the ratio at 50%. The increase in the breakeven premium ratio of
insurer 6 is observed to cause not only an increase in its equilibrium premium but also
a slight incremental increase in other insurers’ premiums.
Price sensitivity parameter, ai, strongly affects the equilibrium premium of each
insurer i. The effects of modifying ai with regard to the market leading insurer 6 and
the market follower 8 are illustrated in Figures 2.4 and 2.5, and all other parameters
remain the same as before. Figure 2.4 shows that the two players’ equilibrium premiums
decrease as the price sensitivity parameter decreases. In Figure 2.5, the number of
contracts is observed to increase as ai increases for both insurers 6 and 8. In addition,
in both Figures 2.4 and 2.5, the slope of insurer 6 is obviously larger than that of insurer
8, indicating that parameter ai is more sensitive with respect to the market leader than
the market follower.
The values of parameters a6 and h1 strongly affect the equilibrium premium at time
t = 1. We give an example of insurer 6 about the sensitivity with respect to these two
parameters in Figure 2.6.
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FIGURE 2.1: Previous (at time t = 0) vs. equilibrium (at time t = 1) premium profiles
in GI . The red solid line is the equilibrium premium profile at time t = 1 with respect
to 12 insurers, which is on the x-axis. Premium values are given on the y-axis. The
blue dash line represents the previous premium profile given in the Table 2.1.
FIGURE 2.2: Previous (at time t = 0) vs. equilibrium (at time t = 1) number of
policies in GI . The left figure illustrates the number of contracts with respect to 12
insurers at time t = 0, which are given in Table 2.1. The right figure shows the equi-
librium number of contracts at time t = 1.
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FIGURE 2.3: Diversity of equilibrium premium profiles with different pi16 in GI . The
market leader 6’s breakeven premium ratio is investigated, which takes values from
30% to 70%. The corresponding 5 different equilibrium premium profiles are given.
FIGURE 2.4: Equilibrium premium sensitivity test of a6 and a8 in GI .
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FIGURE 2.5: Equilibrium number of policies sensitivity test of a6 and a8 in GI .
FIGURE 2.6: Diversity of insurer 6’s equilibrium premium in GI . Different equilib-
rium premium values are given, with respect to different a6 and h1.
2.4.2 Insurance Game II Simulation Results
Using Table 2.1, and the same parameters reported in Table 2.3, the Nash equilibrium
premium profiles in GII are calculated. From Eq. (2.9), the second order condition of
payoff is negative for each insurer i in GII . Similarly, we use the algorithm which is
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presented for the case GI by assuming that rˆ1GII ,i is defined by
rˆ1GII ,i :
q0i + nh2aiq
0
i − h2
∑
j 6=i ajq
0
j
2h2aiq0i (x
1
−i + θ1)
p0i = 0,
where rˆ1GII ,i is the maximal selection of RGII ,i(x
1
−i), see Eq. (2.11), for i at time t = 1
in GII .
Note that the breakeven ratio ki does not affect the best-reply selection inGII . If the
calculated premium for each insurer is located in PGI ,i, the Nash equilibrium is unique
in GII , since the equation of rˆ1GII ,i is a linear one.
Number of market participants n 12
Market presence limit factor h2 0.0205
Market stability factor θ1 1
TABLE 2.3: Environmental parameter values in GII
InGII , for each insurer i, the premiums are retained betweene180 ande900 during
any period, i.e., p1i ∈ [e150,e900]. The other parameters are also restricted, such as the
market presence limit factor h2 ∈ [0.0203, 0.0207] and the market stability factor θ1 ∈
[0.8, 1.2] for any t. Figures 2.7 and 2.8, respectively, show the equilibrium premium
profile and number of contracts from insurers 1 to 12.
In Figure 2.7, similar to GI , market leader insurer 6 tends to increase its premium
until equilibrium. As exposure flows between insurers are enhanced, the ratio between
insurers’ equilibrium premium in GII significantly diverge from the previous. Com-
pared withGI , the market leader has a greater advantage in the competition, which gen-
erates a larger reduction in the policy numbers than in Figure 2.2. Market followers 8
and 9 reduce their premiums significantly to increase their exposure. As demonstrated
in Figure 2.8, the equilibrium number of policies of insurers 8 and 9 approximately
reach the other insurer’s level, excluding the market leader insurer 6.
With the other parameters unaffected, the impacts of modifying ai inG2 with regard
to the market leading insurer 6 and the market follower 8 are illustrated in Figures 2.9
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and 2.10. Similarly as GI , Figures 2.9 and 2.10 indicate that both players’ equilibrium
premiums in GII decrease and the number of contracts increases as the price sensitivity
parameter ai decreases. In addition, we also conclude that the parameter ai with respect
to the market leader is more sensitive than the market follower in GII . Comparing with
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 in GI that a6 is more sensitive than a8 in GII is also noteworthy.
A new parameter, market stability factor θ1, significantly affect the equilibrium pre-
mium profile in GII . Figure 2.11 illustrates the diversity of the equilibrium premium
profiles with a varying market stability factor θ1 from 0.8 to 1.2. As θ1 represents the
whole market’s business condition, it is reasonable to expect the equilibrium profile
entirely moves up or down with different θ1.
Similarly as in GI , we test the sensitivity of a6 and h2 for GII in Figure 2.12. As
we can observe, h2 is much more sensitive than h1, an tiny increase of just 10−4 in h2
causes a compelling decrease in equilibrium premium for insurer 6.
Overall, we observe that insurers with larger market power take advantage in the
competition, and they tend to increase their premium to reach equilibrium. On the
other hand, insurers with less market power tend to decrease their premium requesting
a bigger volume of exposure. The price sensitivity parameter, ai, is quite sensitive. The
market presence limit factor h1, h2, and the market stability factor θ1 have an impact
on the market equilibrium levels, which control the exposure of volume flow among
the insurers and the exposures volume flow into or away from the insurance market,
respectively. Different with GI , a breakeven premium for i appears not to affect the
insurer’s equilibrium premium in GII .
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FIGURE 2.7: Previous (at time t = 0) vs. equilibrium (at time t = 1) premium profiles
in GII . Similar with Figure 2.1.
FIGURE 2.8: Previous (at time t = 0) vs. equilibrium (at time t = 1) number of
policies in GII . Similar with Figure 2.2.
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FIGURE 2.9: Equilibrium premium sensitivity test of a6 and a8 in GII .
FIGURE 2.10: Equilibrium number of policies sensitivity test of a6 and a8 in GII .
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FIGURE 2.11: Diversity of equilibrium premium profiles with different θ1 in GII .
The market stability factor θ1 is investigated which takes values from 0.8 to 1.2. The
corresponding 5 different equilibrium premium profiles are given.
FIGURE 2.12: Diversity of insurer 6’s equilibrium premium in GII . Different equilib-
rium premium values are given, with respect to different a6 and h2.
Chapter 3
Non-Cooperative Dynamic Games for
General Insurance Markets
In the insurance industry, the number of product-specific policies from different compa-
nies has increased significantly. The strong market competition has boosted the demand
for a competitive premium. In actuarial science, scant literature still exists on how com-
petition actually affects the calculation and the pricing cycles of company’s premiums.
In this paper, we model premium dynamics via a differential game, and study the insur-
ers’ equilibrium premium pricing in a competitive market. We apply an optimal control
theory methodology to determine the open-loop Nash equilibrium premium strategies.
In this direction, two models are formulated and studied. The market power of each
insurance company is characterized by a price sensitive parameter, and the business
volume is affected by the solvency ratio. Considering the average market premiums,
the first model studies an exponential relation between premium strategies and volume
of business. The other model initially characterize the competition between any selected
pair of insurers, then aggregates all the paired competitions in the market. Numerical
examples illustrate the premium dynamics, and show that premium cycles may exist in
equilibrium.
Keywords: Insurance Market Competition; Price Cycles; Non-cooperative Game; Sol-
vency Ratio
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3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Motivation
This paper constructs two models for determining the price of general policies in com-
petitive, non-cooperative, insurance markets. In the corresponding literature, there is lit-
tle available research on how insurance premiums are modelled in competitive markets
and how they respond to changes offered by competitors [12, 25, 22]. Despite the fact
that in many lines of insurance the presence of underlying cycles is clearly observed,
a mathematical formulation, modelling and analysis of those underwriting strategies
have been a constant endeavour to better understand the behaviour of insurance markets
[10, 47, 15, 13, 61, 11, 32, 56, 36, 22].
Since the competition is getting higher among insurance companies, and in several
markets worldwide, the domination by a relatively few companies appears often in the
determination of insurance premium prices, a fair, but also a commercially attractive
premium is not any more a simple risk assessment exercise, but a highly challenging
decision. Consequently, the demand of a mathematical model is more essential than
ever to investigate the connectivity among the competitors in the corresponding markets
and to understand the formulation of pricing cycles.
3.1.2 New approach: Generalized finite-time differential game mod-
els
In this paper, generalized finite-time differential games with finite number of players
are constructed. The formulation allows to investigate the mechanism for the pricing
cycles by solving NE premium profiles. When the market reaches a NE, no insurer
can increase its payoff by modifying its strategy (over the time) given by the optimal
strategy profile of other insurers. As in [22], the optimal control theory methodology is
incorporated.
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Moreover, under a continuous-time framework, for any time unit, the number of
new contracts is modelled considering competition, while the loss of exposure due to
policy termination is assumed to be proportional to the current volume of exposure. In
this direction, two competition-related models are proposed, studied and compared: (1)
Model I adopts the exponential demand function of [54, 55, 22] considering the market
average premium; while, (2) Model II is formulated based on the aggregate game in
[62].
Analytically, the price sensitivity parameter, which has been proposed in [62], is
implemented as a market power parameter. The solvency ratio is the capital per unit
of premium. Solvency ratio is taken into consideration in the competition between
each pair of insurers, as it is observable by the policyholders. In [56], it is stated that
the management department will adjust its actuarial premium price with respect to the
current solvency ratio. Considering historical data, when the capital amount is relatively
high compared with actuarial premium value, insurance companies prefer to increase
its premium value. The reason is that the insurers are more confident to pay the claims
under this condition. In the present paper, we implement the concept of solvency ratio
in the competition. Differently from [56], we develop an optimization problem where
the solvency ratio is embedded in formulating an insurance game. In particular, we
assume that if the (observable) solvency ratio is high, the number of new contracts sold
will be affected less by other insurers’ premium strategies . Interestingly, pricing cycles
are observed in the numerical example of Model II, even without the consideration of
any stochastic parameter.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the
construction of the two-insurance market competition models. In Section 3.3, the opti-
mization problem is formulated for the two models, and the Hamiltonians are presented.
Section 3.4 presents a numerical example for each of those two models.
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3.2 Model Construction
3.2.1 Baseline model
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the finite set of insurers in the market. For a given time period
[0, T ], we assume that every insurer i ∈ N aims to maximize the net present value of
its terminal wealth. At every point in time t ∈ [0, T ], every insurer i ∈ N makes a
decision to set the premium pi(t) (per unit of exposure). The decisions of all insurers in
the market lead to the state variable θi(t) = (ki(t), qi(t)), where ki(t) > 0 is the capital
(per unit of exposure) of insurer i, and qi(t) > 0 is the volume of exposure of insurer i
at time t, which represents the number of policies. Denote Pi(t) = {pi(t′) : t′ ≤ t} and
Θi(t) = {θi(t′) : t′ ≤ t}. Moreover, we write M−i(t) = {Mj(t) : j ∈ N\{i}} for any
function M , k˙i(t) = ddtki(t) and q˙i(t) =
d
dt
qi(t).
In line with [23], we assume that there is a fixed length τ of insurance policies, and
all new and existing policyholders are required to pay the current premium rate pi(t).
We illustrate in Figure 3.1 how the underwriting polices affect the exposure volume of
the insurer.
FIGURE 3.1: The dashed line is the volume of exposure q(t) with respect to time t,
while thick lines denote the duration of policies with the same start date.
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The change in exposure at any time t can be split up into the one gained due to the
generation of new contracts and the other one lost due to policy termination. In order
to proceed further, in the next paragraphs we identify the necessary details of those two
effects.
In order to use conventional control theory, we follow [23] by assuming that the loss
due to policy termination is proportional to τ−1 qi(t) for any insurer i. Then, the state
equation of exposure for insurer i is given by
q˙i(t) = mi(t)qi(t)− τ−1 qi(t), (3.1)
where mi(t) is the marginal number of new policies sold at time t per unit of exposure.
The value of mi(t) may depend on (pi(t), θi(t), p−i(t), θ−i(t)). As illustrated in Figure
3.1, the bottom line indicates the group of exposure (policies) expired at time t, which
is τ−1 qi(t); the top line represents the group of new policies mi(t)qi(t); and the rest of
lines stand for the holding policies at time t.
Define Ii(t, t + ∆t) as the premium income of insurer i in period [t, t + ∆t) and
Ci(t, t+∆t) as the cost of holding capital. Here, we assume that the premiums are paid
at the beginning of each contract and all insurance policies have a fixed length τ , and
so Ii(t, t+ ∆t) is the premium income of the new contracts generated. For a small time
period ∆t after t, we have
Ii(t, t+ ∆t) = pi(t)mi(t) qi(t) ∆t+ o(∆t
2).
Define pii > 0 as the constant break-even premium (per unit of exposure) for insurer
i, and βi ∈ (0, 1) as the depreciation of capital for insurer i. The break-even premium
pii is the deterministic insurance claim that needs to be paid per unit of exposure (see,
e.g., [22]). The cost of holding capital Ci(t, t+∆t) during the period [t, t+∆t) is given
by
Ci(t, t+ ∆t) = βiKi(t) ∆t+ o(∆t
2).
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Moreover, the insurer needs to pay pii qi(t) ∆t+ o(∆t2) for insurance claims during the
period [t, t+ ∆t). The total capital difference for insurer i between time t and t+ ∆t is
given by
∆Ki(t) = Ii(t, t+ ∆t)− Ci(t, t+ ∆t)− pii qi(t) ∆t+ o(∆t2)
= (pi(t)mi(t)− pii − βi ki(t)) qi(t)∆t+ o(∆t2).
The volume of insurer’s exposure is also modified considering the entry of new
business and the expiration of existing policies. The difference of capital per exposure
in period [t,∆t) equals to
∆ki(t) = ki(t+ ∆t)− ki(t)
=
Ki(t+ ∆t)
qi(t+ ∆t)
− ki(t)
=
Ki(t) + ∆Ki(t)
qi(t) + q˙i(t)∆t
− ki(t) + o(∆t2)
=
ki(t) + (pi(t)mi(t)− pii − βi ki(t)) ∆t
1 + (mi(t)− τ−1) ∆t − ki(t) + o(∆t
2)
=
(
pi(t)mi(t)− pii − ki(t)
(
βi +mi(t)− τ−1
))
∆t+ o(∆t2),
by using a Taylor series expansion. Therefore, the state equation of capital per
exposure for insurer i is given by
k˙i(t) = pi(t)mi(t)− pii − ki(t)
(
βi +mi(t)− τ−1
)
. (3.2)
In line with [22], we propose the following time-separable utility function for insurer
i:
ui(Pi(T ); Θi(T )) =
∫ T
0
e−ζtFi(pi(t); θi(t))dt. (3.3)
Here, ζ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, and
Fi(pi(t); θi(t)) = (pi(t)mi(t)− pii − βiki(t))qi(t). (3.4)
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A set of control functions t 7→ (p∗1(t), p∗2(t), . . . , p∗n(t)) is a NE for the game within
the class of open-loop strategies if the following holds. For any insurer i, the control
p∗i (·) provides a solution to the optimal control problem:
maximize ui(Pi(T ); Θi(T )), (3.5)
over the set of controllers, Pi(T ), where the set of controllers of other insurers, P−i(t), is
feasible, and the system has dynamics: {p1(0), ..., pn(0)} and {θ1(0), ..., θn(0)} given,
and
k˙i(t) = pi(t)mi(t)− pii − ki(t)
(
βi +mi(t)− τ−1
)
,
q˙i(t) = mi(t)qi(t)− τ−1 qi(t),
for all i ∈ N. Here we assume ki and qi always exist for all i and t.
The rate of generating business mi is affected by market competition. We propose
two models in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 that are defined as Model I and Model II, re-
spectively. Inspired by [54, 55] and [22], Model I investigates exponential relations
between exposure volume and premium competition. Market average premium is also
considered. On the other hand, Model II characterizes exposure volume regarding the
aggregation of competition among all the pairs of insurers. Furthermore, the price elas-
ticity function concept is adopted to investigate the exposure volume change in Model
II, as an extension of [62].
3.2.2 Model I Formulation
Model I adopts the exponential demand function proposed in [54, 55] and [22] for mod-
elling the competition between any pair of insurers. Let us define the function ρi of
insurer i at time t as follows,
ρi(t) = −(pi(t)− p¯−i(t)),
Chapter 3. Non-Cooperative Dynamic Games for General Insurance Markets 54
where p¯−i(t) is the average premium of all the other insurers in insurance market except
i. When ρi(t) is positive, insurer i’s premium pi(t) is less than p¯−i(t); then, we assume
that insurer i tends to gain exposure from the rest of insurance market. Policies flow in
a reverse manner when ρi is negative. We model the rate of selling new policies mi(t)
for insurer i at time t as
mi(t) = τ
−1 h1 ri e
bi ρi(t)− pi(t)ki(t) , (3.6)
where bi > 0 is the price sensitivity parameter of insurer i ∈ N, h1 > 0 is a market
presence limit factor, and ri > 0 is a benchmark parameter of insurer i.
In line with the exponential demand function in [54, 55], we initially model m as
τ−1 ebiρi(t). When, pi(t) < p¯−i(t), τ−1 ebiρi(t) is larger than τ−1. We further augment
this effect with an influence of the solvency ratio on competition, which is a new concept
in our paper.
We study the solvency ratio, and its impact on the premium pricing strategy of in-
surer i. [56] assumed that the management department will adjust the actuarial premium
price by comparing the insurer’s current solvency ratio and a benchmark solvency ratio.
Inspired by [56], we model the solvency ratio as ki(t)
pi(t)
. We further modify the expo-
nential component to e
biρi(t)+ln(ri)− p
t
i
kt
i , where ri is a positive benchmark solvency ratio
for insurer i. When solvency ratio ki(t)
pi(t)
increases, the rate of selling new policies mti
increases, which describes insurers with larger solvency ratio can obtain more policies.
3.2.3 Model II Formulation
With the price sensitive parameter h2 proposed by [62], Model II initially specifies the
flow of policies between any pair of insurers. The entire insurance market competition
can be evaluated by aggregating among the different pairs of insurers. For any insurer j,
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let us define the transfer function ρj→i(t) from insurer j to insurer i at time t as follows
ρj→i(t) = 1− pi(t)
pj(t)
.
The transfer function ρj→i(t) describes the key assumption: for time t, when insurer
i’s premium is less than insurer j’s premium, insurer j’s policies tend to flow to insurer
i. Policies flow in a reverse direction when pi(t) > pj(t). We assume that the exposure
flow from insurer j to insurer i is given by
qj→i(t) = h2 ai ρj→i(t)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
qi(t), (3.7)
where ai > 0 is the price sensitivity parameter of insurer i, h2 > 0 is a market presence
limit factor, and ri > 0 is a benchmark parameter of insurer i. Typically, we have
qj→i(t) 6= −qi→j(t).
The exposure changes over time follow from the competition in the entire market.
It is obtained by summing up all the bilateral policies’ gains or losses. The aggregate
exposure gain or loss for insurer i is then given by
q˙i(t) =
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
qj→i(t). (3.8)
We allow that
∑
i∈N q˙i(t) is not equal to zero, since potential customers may enter
(leave) the insurance market when the premiums are low (high).
Substituting (3.7) in (3.8) yields that the rate of generation of new policies for insurer
i at time t in Model II is given by
mi(t) = τ
−1 + h2 ai
1
ri
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
. (3.9)
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3.3 Theoretical Results
As it was discussed in Section 3.2, the NE pricing strategy for the ith insurer follows
from a maximization problem over the set of feasible premium strategies given the fea-
sible pricing strategies of the other insurer [14]. Thus, in this section, the corresponding
Hamiltonians and related results for Models I and II are presented.
3.3.1 Optimisation Problem for Model I
From (3.4)-(3.6), we derive
Fi(pi(t); θi(t)) =
(
pi(t) τ
−1 h1 ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) − pii − βi ki(t)
)
qi(t). (3.10)
We obtain the following dynamics for the state variables of insurer i:
k˙i(t) = pi(t) τ
−1 h1 ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) − pii
−ki(t)
(
βi + τ
−1 h1 ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) − τ−1
)
, (3.11)
and
q˙i(t) =
(
h1 ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) − 1
)
τ−1qi(t). (3.12)
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With the objective function and state equations, the Hamiltonian for the ith insurer
is given by1
Hi = e
−ζt
(
pi(t) τ
−1 h1 ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) − pii − βi ki(t)
)
qi(t)
+
∑
j∈N
µij(t)
[
pj(t) τ
−1 h1 rj e
bj (p¯−j(t)−pj(t))− pj(t)kj(t) − pij
−kj(t)
(
βj + τ
−1 h1 rj e
bj (p¯−j(t)−pj(t))− pj(t)kj(t) − τ−1
)]
+
∑
j∈N
λij(t)
(
h1 rj e
bj (p¯−j(t)−pj(t))− pj(t)kj(t) − 1
)
τ−1qj(t). (3.13)
For any j ∈ N, the adjoint equations are given by
dλij(t)
dt
= − ∂Hi
∂qj(t)
, λij(T ) = 0, (3.14)
dµij(t)
dt
= − ∂Hi
∂kj(t)
, µij(T ) = 0. (3.15)
Lemma 3.1. For any j and t, it holds that λij(t) = 0 and µij(t) = 0 for all j 6= i.
Proof. For j 6= i, it holds that
dλij(t)
dt
= −λij(t)
(
h1 rj e
bj (p¯−j(t)−pj(t))− pj(t)kj(t) − 1
)
τ−1. (3.16)
If λij(t) 6= 0, let A =
(
h1 rj e
bj (p¯−j(t)−pj(t))− pj(t)kj(t) − 1
)
τ−1. When A 6= 0, we have
| dλij(t)
A · λij(t) | = dt⇔
∫
| dλij(t)
A · λij(t) | =
∫
dt⇔ ln |λij(t)| = |A · t|+ c
and, hence, we get |λij(t)| = e|A∗t|+c. With λij(T ) = 0, it is a contradiction. When
A = 0, we have λij(t) = 0 by construction. Hence λij(t) = 0, when j 6= i. We can
prove that µij(t) = 0 for all j 6= i in a similar way.
1With slight abuse of notation, we do not explicitly write that the Hamiltonian depends on
(pi(t), θi(t), p−i(t), θ−i(t)).
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Using Lemma 3.1, the Hamiltonian in (3.13) simplifies to
Hi = e
−ζt
(
pi(t) τ
−1 h1 ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) − pii − βi ki(t)
)
qi(t)
+µii(t)
[
pi(t) τ
−1 h1 ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) − pii
−ki(t)
(
βi + τ
−1 h1 ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) − τ−1
)]
+λii(t)
(
h1 ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) − 1
)
τ−1qi(t). (3.17)
From the adjoint equations, we have
dλii(t)
dt
= − ∂Hi
∂qi(t)
= −e−ζt
(
pi(t) τ
−1 h1 ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) − pii − βi ki(t)
)
−λii(t)
(
h1 ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) − 1
)
τ−1, (3.18)
and
dµii(t)
dt
= − ∂Hi
∂ki(t)
= −e−ζ t qi(t)
(
pi(t)
2 ki(t)
−2 τ−1 h1 ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) − βi
)
−µii(t)
[
− βi − τ−1 h1 ri ebi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))−
pi(t)
ki(t) + τ−1
+ (pi(t)− ki(t)) pi(t) ki(t)−2 τ−1 h1 ri ebi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))−
pi(t)
ki(t)
]
−λii(t) pi(t) ki(t)−2 τ−1 h1 ri ebi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))−
pi(t)
ki(t) qi(t). (3.19)
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The first-order conditions of the Hamiltonian, defined in ((3.17)), are given by
∂Hi
∂pi(t)
= e−ζ t qi(t)
(
pi(t)
(−bi − ki(t)−1)+ 1) τ−1 h1 ri ebi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t)
+µii(t)
[
(pi(t)− ki(t))
(−bi − ki(t)−1) τ−1 h1 ri ebi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t)
+τ−1 h1 ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t)
]
+λii(t) qi(t)
(−bi − ki(t)−1) τ−1 h1 ri ebi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) . (3.20)
which must equal zero for all t ∈ [0, T ] and i ∈ N.
The second-order condition of the Hamiltonian is given by
∂2Hi
∂pi(t)
2 = e
−ζ t qi(t)
(
2
(−bi − ki(t)−1)+ (bi + ki(t)−1)2) τ−1 h1 ri ebi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t)
+µii(t)
[
2
(−bi − ki(t)−1) τ−1 h1 ri ebi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t)
+
(
pti − kti
) (
bi + ki(t)
−1)2τ−1 h1 ri ebi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t)]
+λii(t) qi(t)
(
bi + ki(t)
−1)2τ−1 h1 ri ebi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) . (3.21)
It is well-known in optimal control theory that the solution of the first-order conditions
is a NE when the second-order conditions of Hamiltonians are non-positive for all t ∈
[0, T ] and i ∈ N.
3.3.2 Optimisation Problem for Model II
In Model II, we derive
Fi(pi(t); θi(t)) =
pi(t)
τ−1 + ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
− pii − βi ki(t)
 qi(t),
(3.22)
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Analogous to (3.11)-(3.12), we derive the following state equations
k˙i(t) = pi(t)
τ−1 + ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri

−pii − ki(t)
βi + ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
 , (3.23)
q˙i(t) =
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
qi(t). (3.24)
With the objective function and state equations, the Hamiltonian for insurer i is
given by
Hi = e
−ζt
pi(t)
τ−1 + ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
− pii − βi ki(t)
 qi(t)
+
∑
j∈N
µij(t)
[
pj(t)
τ−1 + ∑
`∈N,`6=j
h2 aj
(
1− pj(t)
p`(t)
)
e
pj(t)
kj(t)
rj

−pij − kj(t)
βj + ∑
`∈N,`6=j
h2 aj
(
1− pj(t)
p`(t)
)
e
pj(t)
kj(t)
rj
]
+
∑
j∈N
λij
 ∑
`∈N,` 6=j
h2 aj
(
1− pj(t)
p`(t)
)
e
pj(t)
kj(t)
rj
qj(t)
 . (3.25)
For any j ∈ N, the adjoint equations are given by
dλij(t)
dt
= − ∂Hi
∂qj(t)
, λij(T ) = 0, (3.26)
dµij(t)
dt
= − ∂Hi
∂kj(t)
, µij(T ) = 0. (3.27)
Lemma 3.2. For any i and t, it holds that λij(t) = 0 and µij(t) = 0 for all j 6= i.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 3.1, and so it is omitted.
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Due to Lemma 3.2, the Hamiltonian in ((3.25)) simplifies to
Hi = e
−ζt
pi(t)
τ−1 + ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
− pii − βi ki(t)
 qi(t)
+ µii(t)
[
pi(t)
τ−1 + ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri

−pii − ki(t)
βi + ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
]
+ λii
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
qi(t)
 , (3.28)
From the adjoint equations, we get
dµii(t)
dt
= − ∂Hi
∂ki(t)
= −e−ζ,t qi(t),
[
pi(t)
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
(−(ki(t))2 pi(t))

−
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
(
− 1
pj(t)
+
1
ki(t)
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
))]
−µii(t)
[
(pi(t)− ki(t))
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
(−(ki(t))2 pi(t))
− βi
−
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
]
−λii qi(t)
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
(−(ki(t))2 pi(t))
 , (3.29)
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and
dλii(t)
dt
= − ∂Hi
∂qi(t)
= −e−ζt
pi(t)
τ−1 + ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
− pii − βi ki(t)

−λii
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
 . (3.30)
The first-order conditions of the Hamiltonian in ((3.28)) are given by
∂Hi
∂pi(t)
= e−ζ t qi(t)
[
τ−1 +
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri

+pi(t)
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
(
− 1
pj(t)
+
1
ki(t)
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
))]
+µii(t)
[
τ−1 +
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri

− (pi(t)− ki(t))
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
(
− 1
pj(t)
+
1
ki(t)
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
))]
+λii(t) qi(t)
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
(
− 1
pj(t)
+
1
ki(t)
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)) .(3.31)
which must equal zero for all t ∈ [0, T ] and i ∈ N.
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The second-order condition of the Hamiltonian in ((3.28)) is given by
∂2Hi
∂ri(t)
2 = e
−ζ t qi(t)
[
2
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
(
− 1
pj(t)
+
1
ki(t)
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
))
+pi(t)
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
(
−2ki(t) + pj(t)− pi(t)
ki(t)
2 pj(t)
)]
+µii(t)
[
2
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
(
− 1
pj(t)
+
1
ki(t)
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
))
+ (pi(t)− ki(t))
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
(
−2ki(t) + pj(t)− pi(t)
ki(t)
2 pj(t)
)]
+λii(t) qi(t)
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
h2 ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
(−(ki(t))2 pi(t))
 ,(3.32)
which must be non-positive for all t ∈ [0, T ] and i ∈ N.
3.4 Numerical Application
In this section, the numerical application for both two models is introduced in a com-
petitive insurance market. Instead of calculating the NE with respect to many players,
more attention is paid to the formation of premium pricing cycles regarding market
competition.
3.4.1 Model I
A two players’ insurance game is constructed for Model I, with insurers 1 and 2. Then,
we have ten variables (p1, p2, k1, k2, q1, q2, µ11, µ22, λ11, λ22), two first-order conditions
of the Hamiltonian for the two players, and eight ODEs (k˙1, k˙2, q˙1, q˙2, ˙µ11, ˙µ22, ˙λ11,
˙λ22).
We observe that when (3.20) equals to zero, the two players’ premium is not corre-
lated, thus p˙1 can be obtained by differentiating the corresponding solution. Similarly,
p˙2 can also be calculated. Under these circumstances, we will have 10 variables and 10
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ODEs regarding each variable. Considering the initial conditions and terminal condi-
tions, a Bounded Value Problem (BVP) is formulated, which can be solved using Matlab
Programming.
Algorithm of Calculating Equilibrium Pricing Strategy for Model I
In this section, the main steps of the algorithm are presented, whereas the appendix
provides the details of the algorithm.
Step 1: Calculate p1 when the first-order condition of the Hamiltonian for player 1 is
satisfied.
Step 2: Differentiate the p1 obtained in Step 1 with respect to time t to obtain p˙1.
Step 3: Repeat steps 1 and 2 with respect to insurer 2 to calculate p˙2.
Step 4: Right now we have ten variables, p1, p2, k1, k2, q1, q2, µ11, µ22, λ11, λ22 and the
corresponding ordinary differential equations. This is a BVP with six conditions
from the initial information of both players and four terminal conditions from
(3.14) and (3.15), which can be solved by ”bvp45” in Matlab.
Step 5: Test whether the second-order condition of Hamiltonian for both two players are
negative during the whole time interval [0, T ]. If yes, accept the result; If no,
reject.
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Algorithmic Steps using Matlab Programming for Model I
The steps 1 to 3 are presenting using Matlab:
Matlab - Step 1:
% Type in (3.20) with respect to insurer 1, denoted as firstorderH1 .
1: x1=solve(firstorderH1==0, p1) .
Matlab - Step 2:
% Create symbolic variables with respect to t;
1: odex1=diff(x1(t), t);
% odex1 includes diff (k1(t), t), diff (q1(t), t), diff (µ11(t), t) , diff (λ11(t), t).
(3.11), (3.12), (3.19), and (3.18) provide all the above differential
equations.
% Substitute diff (k1(t), t), diff (q1(t), t), diff (µ11(t), t) , diff (λ11(t), t) in odex1.
p˙1 is obtained.
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Matlab - Step 3:
1: init=bvpinit(linspace(0,3,1000),@bc init);
2: sol=bvp4c(@rhs bvp,@bc bvp,init);
3: t=linspace(0,3,1000);
4: BS=deval(sol,t);
5: plot(t,BS(1,:));
6: function rhs=rhs bvp(t,y);
7: rhs=[ p˙1; p˙2;k˙1;k˙2;q˙1;q˙2;µ˙11;µ˙22;λ˙11;λ˙22]
8: function bc=bc bvp(yl, yr)
9: bc=[yl(1)-0.88; yl(2)-1.05; yl(3)-0.6; yl(4)-1; yr(5)-5225; yr(6)-13700;
yr(7); yr(8); yr(9); yr(10)];
% @bc init is the guess.
Numerical Example of Model I
Here, we illustrate an insurance game considering a period of three years. The scenery
in this section is modelled to investigate the competition among two candidates: one
player represents a large market power insurer, while the other is regarded as a relatively
weaker insurer.
Table 3.1 demonstrates the parameter values of our insurance game. Table 3.2 illus-
trates the initial information, including the initial premium, volume of exposure and the
capital per exposure regarding both two insurers.An insurance company with a greater
market power has a larger price sensitivity parameter b. The break-even premium of
both insurers are assumed to be constant during the whole period.
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Number of market participants n 2
Market presence limit factor h1 1
Break-even premium of insurer 1 pi1 0.6
Break-even premium of insurer 2 pi2 0.609
Price sensitivity parameter of insurer 1 b1 0.2
Price sensitivity parameter of insurer 2 b2 0.28
Standard solvency ratio factor of insurer 1 r1 3.3
Standard solvency ratio factor of insurer 2 r2 2.2
Expected rate of return of insurer 1 β1 0.03
Expected rate of return of insurer 2 β2 0.03
time valuing of money ζ 0.02
TABLE 3.1: Parameter values for Model I
Initial premium of insurer 1 p1(0) 0.88
Initial premium of insurer 2 p2(0) 1.05
Initial exposure volume of insurer 1 q1(0) 5225
Initial exposure volume of insurer 2 q2(0) 13700
Initial capital per exposure of insurer 1 k1(0) 0.6
Initial capital per exposure of insurer 2 k2(0 1
TABLE 3.2: Initial information of insurer 1 and insurer 2
The existence of a NE can be proved by finding out one under the game set up from
Tables 3.1 and 3.2. With the algorithm introduced in Section 3.4.1, a premium profile
of both insurers is calculated, which is presented in Figure 3.2, with negative second-
order Hamiltonian profiles observed for both insurers Figure 3.5. Since the second-
order conditions of the Hamiltonian are satisfied, the premium profile that follows from
the first-order conditions constitutes a NE. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 describe the exposure
volume and capital per exposure accordingly.
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FIGURE 3.2: Equilibrium premium profiles of both insurers over three years time in
Model I. The blue line represents insurer 1’s premium profile and the red line shows in-
surer 2’s premium profile. Premium values are given on y-axis while the corresponding
time is on x-axis.
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FIGURE 3.3: Volume of exposure profiles regarding both insurers over three years time
in Model I. The blue line represents insurer 1’s volume of exposure profile and the red
line shows insurer 2’s. Volume of exposure are given on y-axis while the corresponding
time is on x-axis.
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FIGURE 3.4: Exposure per capital profiles for both insurers over three years time in
Model I. The blue line represents insurer 1’s capital profiles (per exposure) and the red
line shows insurer 2’s. Capital are given on y-axis while the corresponding time is on
x-axis.
Although there is a slightly decrement of value of premium, the larger market power
of insurer 2 yields that the equilibrium premiums of insurer 2 keep in a relatively high
level through the whole time horizon. Insurer 1 adopts a relatively low pricing level
with the purpose of absorbing more policies. Insurer 2 slightly lower its capital (per
exposure) through the competition while insurer’s capital (per exposure) inappreciably
increased. No pricing cycles appear in the equilibrium of Model I. The equilibrium
strategies of the two insurers keep stable over the 3-year period. Different sets of pa-
rameters are tested for Model I, and none of the results illustrate any cycles. An obvious
reason is that there is no correlation between two players’ premium while the first-order
conditions of Hamiltonian are satisfied. Similar findings can be confirmed in [22].
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FIGURE 3.5: Second-order conditions of the Hamiltonians for both insurers in Model
I. The blue one refers to insurer 1 while the red represent insurer 2. Both insures’
second-order conditions keep negative through the whole time horizon.
3.4.2 Model II
Regarding now Model II, like in Section 3.4.1, we consider a two players’ game, with
insurers 1 and 2. Similarly as before, we have ten variables (p1, p2, k1, k2, q1, q2, µ11,
µ22, λ11, λ22), two first-order conditions of the Hamiltonian for the two players, and
eight ODEs (k˙1, k˙2, q˙1, q˙2, ˙µ11, ˙µ22, ˙λ11, ˙λ22).
We can eliminate two variables p2 and λ22, and transfer ˙λ22 to the differential equa-
tion of p1. Under these circumstances, we will have eight variables and eight ODEs
regarding each variable. The backward integration considers the standard Mean Value
Theorem, which is adopted in this section in order to solve the BVP.
Algorithm of Calculating Equilibrium Pricing Strategy for Model II
In this section, the main steps of the algorithm are presented, whereas the appendix
provides the details of the algorithm.
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Step 1: Calculate p2 when the first-order condition of the Hamiltonian for player 1 is
satisfied.
Step 2: Get an expression of λ22 from the first-order condition of insurer 2’s Hamiltonian,
with p2 excluded.
Step 3: Differentiate the expression of λ22 with respect to time t. Generate an ordinary
differential equation of p1.
Step 4: Apply a backward iteration of the system with the first-order conditions of Hamil-
tonian for insurer 1 and 2. Terminal values of 10 variables are required to be used
as inputs. From (3.26) and (3.27), it follows that µ11(T ) = µ22(T ) = λ11(T ) =
λ22(T ) = 0. For the other 6 variables, p1(T ), p2(T ), k1(T ), k2(T ), q1(T ), q2(T )
need to satisfy (3.31) in order to be used as inputs.
Since µ11(T ) = µ22(T ) = λ11(T ) = λ22(T ) = 0, (3.31) does not depend on
q1(T ) and q2(T ) at time T . We use the Matlab solver ’fsolve’ to provide p1(T ),
p2(T ) when k1(T ), k2(T ) are fixed, via (3.31).
Then, q1(T ) and q2(T ) will be guessed. Terminal values of the 10 variables are
used as inputs in the backward iteration.
Step 5: Stop until the initial value of p1, p2, k1, k2, q1 and q2 from backward iteration
equals to the initial data value. Otherwise, we adjust the guess of k1(T ), k2(T ),
q1(T ) and q2(T ).
Step 6: From the previous step, we collect the terminal values that yield the correct initial
values. We check whether the second-order conditions of the Hamiltonians of
both players are negative during the whole time interval [0, T ]. If yes, accept the
equilibrium; If no, reject.
Remark 3.3. A game with more players can be also investigated with a similar algo-
rithm. More loops are required to calculate the equilibrium pricing strategy.
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Algorithmic Steps using Matlab Programming for Model II
The steps 1 to 6 are presenting using Matlab:
Matlab - Step 1:
% Type in (3.31) with respect to insurer 1, denoted as FirstorderH1 .
1: x2=solve(FirstorderH1==0, p2) .
Matlab - Step 2:
% Type in (3.31) with respect to insurer 2, denoted as FirstorderH2 .
1: FirstorderH2 fh=matlabFunction(FirstorderH2) ;
2: FirstorderH2 new=FirstorderH2 fh(a2,r2,h2,τ−1,ζ ,t,p1,x2,k2,q2,µ22,λ22) ;
3: x10=solve(FirstorderH2 new==0,λ22) .
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Matlab - Step 3:
% Create symbolic variables with respect to t;
1: dx10=diff(x10(t), t);
% dx10 includes diff (p1(t), t), diff (k1(t), t), diff (k2(t), t), diff (q1(t), t), diff
(q2(t), t), diff (µ11(t), t) , diff (µ22(t), t), diff (λ11(t), t). (3.24), (3.25),
(3.29), and (3.30) provide all the above differential equations, except
diff (p1(t), t).
% Similar as step 2, substitute diff (k1(t), t), diff (k2(t), t), diff (q1(t), t),
diff (q2(t), t) , diff (µ11(t), t) , diff (µ22(t), t), diff (λ11(t), t) with the
corresponding differential equations using ’matlabFunction’. A new function
is generated including diff (p1(t), t), which is denoted as x 10;
2: x 10 - diff (λ22(t), t) == 0.
% (3.30) provides diff (λ22(t), t), an equation of diff (p1(t), t) is obtained.
Matlab - Step 4:
1: x0=[0.000001 0.000001];
2: p=fsolve(@premium,x0);
3: function F = premium(u);
% Substitute p1(N) as u(1), p2(N) as u(2) in ∂H1∂p1 and
∂H2
∂p2
.
4: F = [ ∂H1
∂p1
; ∂H2
∂p2
] ;
5: end .
6: for i=N:-1:1 ;
7: t = (i-1) * T/(N-1) ;
8: % 8 ODE systems with 8 variables:
k1(i− 1) = −dt ∗ diff (k1(t), t) + k1(i);
k2(i− 1) = −dt ∗ diff (k2(t), t) + k2(i);
q1(i− 1) = −dt ∗ diff (q1(t), t) + q1(i);
q2(i− 1) = −dt ∗ diff (q2(t), t) + q2(i);
µ11(i− 1) = −dt ∗ diff (µ11(t), t) + µ11(i);
µ22(i− 1) = −dt ∗ diff (µ22(t), t) + µ22(i);
λ11(i− 1) = −dt ∗ diff (λ11(t), t) + λ11(i);
syms v
% Substitute diff (p1(t), t) with
p1(i)−v
dt
.
% Replace p2, λ22 with x2,x10 correspondingly in diff (λ22(t), t).
p1(i− 1) = vpasolve(x 10− diff (λ22(t), t) == 0);
9: end.
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Matlab - Step 5:
1: k1=linspace(1.6,2,9) ;
2: x0=[0.000001 0.000001];
3: Y=zeros(length(k1),2);
4: for z=1:length(k1) ;
5: fun= @(x)premium(x,k1(z)) ;
6: Y(z,:)=fsolve(fun,x0);
7: end
8: for z=1:length(k1)
9: p1(N, z) = Y (:, 1); ...
10: for i=N:-1:1
11: W = [0,1];
...
12: if (p1(1, z) > 0.885) && (p1(1, z) < 0.895) && (p2(1, z) > 1.535) && (p2(1, z) < 1.545)
...
13: W(index,1)=[k1(z),1];
14: index = index +1;
15: end
16: end
17: end
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Numerical Example of Model II
An 3-years time insurance game regarding Model II is introduced in this section. The
scenery in this section also investigates the competition among a large market power
insurer and a relatively weaker insurer.
Table 3.3 demonstrates the parameter values in the insurance game. Table 3.4 illus-
trates the initial information of the two players.
According to [62], referring to Lerner Index, insurance company with greater mar-
ket power would have a lower price sensitivity parameter a. Considering a monopoly
insurance market, insurer will not lose any policies while increasing its premium value,
that is, its price sensitivity parameter a = 0. The break-even premium of both insurers
are assumed to be constants during the 3 years.
Number of market participants n 2
Market presence limit factor h2 0.58
Break-even premium of insurer 1 pi1 0.6
Break-even premium of insurer 2 pi2 0.61
Price sensitivity parameter of insurer 1 a1 2
Price sensitivity parameter of insurer 2 a2 1.5
Standard solvency ratio factor of insurer 1 r1 2
Standard solvency ratio factor of insurer 2 r2 3.5
Expected rate of return of insurer 1 β1 0.03
Expected rate of return of insurer 2 β2 0.03
Discount factor ζ 0.02
TABLE 3.3: Parameter values for Model II
Initial premium of insurer 1 p1(0) 0.89
Initial premium of insurer 2 p2(0) 1.54
Initial exposure volume of insurer 1 q1(0) 3240
Initial exposure volume of insurer 2 q2(0) 5240
Initial capital per exposure of insurer 1 k1(0) 1.28
Initial capital per exposure of insurer 2 k2(0 1.96
TABLE 3.4: Initial information of insurer 1 and insurer 2
With the algorithm introduced in Section 3.4.2, a NE premium profile for the two
insurers is calculated, which is presented in Figure 3.6. Similarly as for Model I, veri-
fication that it is a NE follows from the negative second-order Hamiltonian profiles for
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both insurers Figure 3.10. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 describe the exposure volume and capital
per exposure, accordingly. Pricing cycles are observed in the whole time period. Fig-
ure 3.6 supports the opinion in previous literatures [10, 15, 61, 11, 32, 36] that pricing
cycles in insurance markets are caused by market competition. Although the premiums
between the two insurers are not proportional, the shape of premium cycle profiles is
similar. Figure 3.6 suggests that insurer 1 follows insurer 2’s pricing strategy. The pre-
mium of insurer 1 even falls below the break-even premium level from the 3rd month to
the 6th month in order to keep competitive and attract more policies. The two insurers’
total capital, displayed in Figure 3.9, remains stable for the first two years. Due to the
increment of premium, both insurers gain massive capital in the third year, which is
particularly true for insurer 1.
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FIGURE 3.6: Equilibrium premium profiles of both insurers over three years time in
Model II. The blue line represents insurer 1’s premium profile and the red line shows
insurer 2’s premium profile. Premium values are given on y-axis while the correspond-
ing time is on x-axis.
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FIGURE 3.7: Volume of exposure profiles regarding both insurers over three years time
in Model II. The blue line represents insurer 1’s volume of exposure profile and the red
line shows insurer 2’s. Volume of exposure are given on y-axis while the corresponding
time is on x-axis.
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FIGURE 3.8: Exposure (per capital) profiles regarding both insurers over three years
time in Model II. The blue line represents insurer 1’s capital profiles (per exposure)
and the red line shows insurer 2’s. Capital are given on y-axis while the corresponding
time is on x-axis.
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FIGURE 3.9: Total capital profiles regarding both insurers over three years time in
Model II. The blue line represents insurer 1’s capital profiles and the red line shows
insurer 2’s. Capital are given on y-axis while the corresponding time is on x-axis.
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FIGURE 3.10: Second-order conditions of the Hamiltonians for both insurers in Model
II. The blue one refers to insurer 1 while the red represent insurer 2. Both insures’
second-order conditions keep negative through the whole time horizon.
Pricing cycles in Model II are appeared to be related with profit margins. When
the break-even premium is relatively low regarding insurers’ premium, insurers intend
to compete with their rivals and more pricing cycles are appeared. Figure 3.11 demon-
strates the equilibrium premium profiles while break-even premium pi1 = 0.8, pi1 = 0.85
and other parameters remain the same in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. Figure 3.12 shows the equi-
librium premium profiles while break-even premium pi1 = 1.2, pi1 = 1.1. As illustrated
in Figure 3.11, premium cycles are founded, but with less amounts; while both insurers’
equilibrium premium slightly increased over the time horizon smoothly.
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FIGURE 3.11: Equilibrium premium profiles of both insurers over three years time in
Model II, while pi1 = 0.8, pi1 = 0.85. The blue line represents insurer 1’s premium
profile and the red line shows insurer 2’s premium profile. Premium values are given
on y-axis while the corresponding time is on x-axis.
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FIGURE 3.12: Equilibrium premium profiles of both insurers over three years time in
Model II, while pi1 = 1.2, pi1 = 1.1. The blue line represents insurer 1’s premium
profile and the red line shows insurer 2’s premium profile. Premium values are given
on y-axis while the corresponding time is on x-axis.
Chapter 4
Multi-stage Stochastic General
Insurance Games with Risk Aversion
Players
4.1 Motivation
In general insurance market, the claims of policies are always the focused part to be
calculated since the claim of each policy is unpredictable. The uncertainty of repaid
claims differs insurance product from other products. In the previous chapters, the con-
stant break-even premium framework is expected to be further analyzed. The expendi-
tures of insurance companies will be discussed separately as exposure related costs and
non-exposure-based costs. In this chapter, the exposure-based component is assumed to
be stochastic.
A multi-stage stochastic game will be constructed. Insurers are considered to be
risk-averse, that is, insurance companies would like to set risk-premiums on their prod-
ucts with the purpose of avoiding risk. Constant absolute risk-aversion (CARA) func-
tion will be adopted in this chapter for each player. The multi-stage insurance game will
be solved by finding out the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. A numerical example
80
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will be given to explore the effect of risk aversion on premium pricing strategy with
stochastic claims .
4.2 Baseline Model
Considering an insurance market with N=1,...,n insurers, this section investigate non-
cooperative games over M=1,...,m stages for insurance market. Each insurer is a player
and assumed to maximize its expected utility of net income for every single stage. That
is, the preferences of insurance companies are explicitly myopic. 1
Different from other products, the claim of insurance policies are not fixed. Re-
garding the uncertain claim, we explicitly separate the ”break-even premium” (which
is mentioned in both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) into two components: exposure-based pi
and non-exposure-based pˆi. For i ∈ N and s ∈M, we propose pˆi is a constant and
pisi∼N
(
µsi , σ
s
i
2
)
(4.1)
pˆi are the costs which are not related with policies, such as labor costs, operating
costs, building expenses, etc. pi investigates the costs based on holding the exposures,
such as claims, etc. The costs per exposure are modelled by summing up all the risks of
expenditure and then divided into each exposure. Note that for any insurer i at different
stage s, µsi and σ
s
i could be different due to market conditions. Insurance companies
usually predict the values based on previous stages’ information and market situations.
In line with Chapter 2, the net income Isi that concerns insurer i and stage s is
formulated as follows,
Isi = −αiws−1i + (1− αi)(psi − pisi )qsi − pˆisi .
1This chapter aims to investigate the influence of stochastic claims on premium pricing. In addition,
the dynamic programming has been considered in previous chapter. Hence we assume that insurers are
myopic. Relevant assumptions are used in many papers of game theory [53, 27, 38, 29, 26].
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For insurer i, psi is the premium value per unit of exposure at stage s; q
s
i represents
the holding exposure volume at stage s; wsi is the holding wealth at stage s. p
s
i , q
s
i , pi
s
i ,
pˆisi are all positive and αi ∈ (0, 1) is a given parameter that refers to the cost ratio
of holding insurer i’s wealth. Each insurer is assumed to receive the premium from
policyholders at the beginning of s and psi , q
s
i , pi
s
i , pˆi
s
i remain the same at stage s, i.e.
time in interval [s, s + 1) . It is also assumed that each insurer has perfect knowledge
of its previous information, which is regarded as constants at stage s. A decision of
premium psi will affect the volume of exposure q
s
i for insurer i due to the competition
with other insurers. The volume changes of q among stages cause further differences to
the net income of insurers and the market competition henceforth.
Referring to (4.1), one can deduce that
Isi∼N (µsIi, σsIi) .
Where
µsIi = −αiws−1i + (1− αi)(psi − µsi )qsi − pˆisi ,
σsIi = (1− αi)2 qsi 2 σsi 2.
Other than previous chapters, insurers are regarded as risk averse, i.e, risk pre-
mium will be applied in pricing insurance policies. Furthermore, Constant absolute
risk-aversion (CARA) function is adopted. That is,
U(Isi ) = −e−λ
s
i I
s
i , λsi > 0.
λsi is denoted as risk averse parameter. Since I
s
i is normally distributed, according
to [3], the objective of insurer i to maximize the expected utility E[U(Isi )] of the net
income at stage s is equivalent to
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Maxpsi u
s
i = µ
s
Ii −
1
2
λsi σ
s
Ii
= −αiws−1i + (1− αi)(psi − µsi )qsi − pˆisi
−1
2
λsi (1− αi)2 qsi 2 σsi 2. (4.2)
usi is the payoff of insurer i at stage s.
Moreover note that the Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion is given by
− U
′′(Isi )
U ′(Isi )
= λsi .
This means that, at stage s, the larger λsi , the more risk averse insurer i is.
Similar as previous chapters, the value of qsi needed to be further analyzed which
implies the competition of insurance market.
4.3 Market Competition
This section investigates the quotient price function in [22], which considers the market
average premium (exclude insurer itself) as an aggregate. The exposure volume is mod-
elled through the comparison insurer’s premium strategy with market average premium
at current stage,
qsi =
(
h− ai p
s
i
p¯s−i
)+
qs−1i
Where h is the market presence limit factor, which controls the amount of exposure
insurers could gain attributable to the competition. ai is price sensitivity parameter of
insurer i 2. Both h and ai are positive. p¯s−i is the market average premium exclude
insurer i at stage s. One can deduce the following lemma from Eq. (4.2).
2Price sensitivity parameter ai plays a similar role regarding previous chapters, which is not further
investigated here.
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Lemma 4.1. For the above proposed quotient price function, the payoff usi of insurer i
at stage s is given by
usi = −αiws−1i + (1− αi) (psi − µsi )
(
h− ai p
s
i
p¯s−i
)
qs−1i − pˆisi
= − 1
p¯s−i
(1− αi) ai qs−1i
(
1 +
1
2
σsi
2 λsi (1− αi)
ai
p¯s−i
qs−1i
)
psi
2
+ (1− αi) qs−1i
(
h+
ai µ
s
i
p¯s−i
+ λi h (1− αi) ai
p¯s−i
σsi
2 qs−1i
)
psi
−αiws−1i − pˆisi − (1− αi) qs−1i µsi h−
1
2
λsi (1− αi)2 h2 σsi 2 qs−1i 2. (4.3)
4.4 Game Construction
Let us define an N-insurer game, G, in a M-stage framework: for a stage s ∈ M,
the number of insurer is n. Each insurer i’s strategy at stage s is P si , which stands
for the action setting premium as the value of psi , whereas Pi is the set of strategies.
Pi ≡ P 1i ×· · ·×Pmi is the strategy profile for i over all stages. We use P˜ si to denote the
equilibrium strategy for insurer i at stage s and P˜i to denote the equilibrium strategy
profile over all stages. Insurer i’s payoff function is defined as usi : P
s → R, where
Ps ≡ Ps1× · · ·×PsN and p is an arbitrary profile inP . The notation ps−i ∈P−i stands
for {P s1 , . . . , P si−1, P si+1, . . . , P sNs}, which is used to represent the strategy profile of
other players at time t. (P si ,P
s
−i) ∈Ps decomposes a strategy profile in two parts, the
insurer i’s strategy and other insurers’ components. Given this game in the insurance
market, instead of calculating the optimal premium that maximises a single insurer’s
wealth, the calculation of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is targeted. Note that
every subgame perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.
Here we give the definition of a multi-stage stochastic insurance game with risk
aversion players with respect to the model above.
Definition 4.2. A game G =< (Pi, usi )i∈N,s∈M > has a finite set of players N, a finite
set of stages M, with compact, convex, positive strategy set Pi with respect to every i,
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whereas usi is the payoff function for i at stage s. This type of game is called Multi-stage
Stochastic Insurance Game with Risk Aversion Players.
Moreover, the definition of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium is given as follows.
Definition 4.3 (Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium). [40] A strategy profile P˜ is a Sub-
game Perfect Nash Equilibirum (SPE) in game G if for any subgame G’ of G, P˜|G′ is a
Nash Equilibrium of G’ .
4.5 Main Results
Lemma 4.4. Based on the payoff functions stated in the Eq. (4.3), G is an aggregate
game.
Proof. Denote g = p¯s−i as the aggregate of GI game. Then, the payoff function turns
out to be
usi = −αiws−1i + (1− αi) (psi − µsi )
(
h− ai p
s
i
g
)
qs−1i − pˆisi
= −1
g
(1− αi) ai qs−1i
(
1 +
1
2
σsi
2 λsi (1− αi)
ai
g
qs−1i
)
psi
2
+ (1− αi) qs−1i
(
h+
ai µ
s
i
g
+ λi h (1− αi) ai
g
σsi
2 qs−1i
)
psi
−αiws−1i − pˆisi − (1− αi) qs−1i µsi h−
1
2
λsi (1− αi)2 h2 σsi 2 qs−1i 2.
There exists an aggregate function in G, where the payoff function is only depend on
insurer i’s strategy P si and g. Thus, the statement of the Lemma is derived.
Lemma 4.5. The Nash equilibrium at any stage s in G exists.
Proof. Pi, is a compact, convex strategy set, and usi is a concave function of psi . The
Nash equilibrium at any stage s exists according to fixed point theorem [1].
Theorem 4.6. Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPE) in game G exists.
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Proof. For each stage of game G, it is a subgame G’ of G with imperfect information.
From Lemma 4.5, start from the last stage m by backward induction and at each stage
there exist a equilibrium premium strategy. If SPE does not exist in game G, it is a
contradiction.
Lemma 4.7. Considering the game G with the lower bound ⊥Pi and up bound >Pi for
Pi. If p˜si ∈ [⊥Pi ,>Pi ], p˜si is best-response correspondence for insurer i. While
p˜si =
(
h+
ai µ
s
i
p¯s−i
+ λi h (1− αi) aip¯s−i σ
s
i
2 qs−1i
)
2 ai
(
1 + 1
2
σsi
2 λsi (1− αi) aip¯s−i q
s−1
i
) p¯s−i (4.4)
Proof. p˜si is the solution while the first order derivatives of u
s
i = 0. It is shown below
that the first order derivatives of usi is negative.
∂2usi
∂psi
2 = −
2
p¯s−i
(1− αi) ai qs−1i
(
1 +
1
2
σsi
2 λsi (1− αi)
ai
p¯s−i
qs−1i
)
< 0
When p˜si ∈ [⊥Pi ,>Pi ], p˜si is a global maximum. Thus, the statement of the Lemma
is derived.
4.6 Numerical Example
In this section, a numerical example with 5 non-life insurance companies based on the
number of contracts (i.e., volume of business) they have in their portfolios is proposed
to illustrate the main modelling characteristics and theoretical findings of this chapter
regarding 5 stages. Referring to the information at previous s − 1, the pricing strategy
for the entire market of insurers is derived by finding the Nash equilibrium premiums at
stage s. The impact of different parameters involved in the process to the equilibrium
premiums is also analyzed. 3
3Finding out a pure strategy SPE is the approach to solve the game G in the section of application.
The uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium at each stage is not further investigated in this chapter.
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It is considered here that all insurance companies price policies at any positive real
numbers, i.e. P si ∈ (0,+∞). This means that, if p˜si is positive, it is the equilibrium pre-
mium for insurer i at stage s. Regarding stage s, one can find out the Nash equilibrium
profiles by implementing the following algorithm in Matlab:
Step 1: Type in Eq.(4.4) for all i .
Step 2: Solve the system of p˜si using code ’fsolve’ starting at a positive point.
Parameters Insurer Insurer Insurer Insurer Insurer
1 2 3 4 5
q0i 1000 2000 3000 2000 500
w0i 40000 40000 100000 40000 10000
h 3 3 3 3 3
αi 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
ai 2.2 2 1.6 2 2.5
pˆisi , ∀s ∈M 15000 20000 30000 20000 8000
λsi , ∀s ∈M 0.25 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.1
µsi , ∀s ∈M 100 100 100 100 100
σsi , ∀s ∈M 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
TABLE 4.1: Benchmark Parameters
The standard values of all parameters are set up in Table 4.1, and they can be used as
a benchmark. A scenario is investigated with a market leader insurer 3, two equivalent
size insurers 2 & 4 and market followers 1 & 5. The price sensitivity parameter ai
which indicates the market power of insurers is assumed to be the same over all stages.
The less ai indicates larger market power since insurer receives more policies while
competing with other insurers. The only difference between insurer 2 & 4 is that they
have different degrees of risk inverse as λs2 = 0.1 and λ
s
4 = 0.25. As mentioned in
previous section, the larger λsi , the more risk averse insurer i is. This means, insurer 4
would like to set a larger risk premium to avoid risk.
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Stages Insurer Insurer Insurer Insurer Insurer
s 1 2 3 4 5
s=1 204.3472 216.3396 255.7188 220.8273 185.5081
s=2 203.9184 216.0736 255.6116 220.1621 185.2177
s=3 203.4642 215.7725 255.3761 219.4802 184.9129
s=4 203.0978 215.5162 255.2366 218.9803 184.6662
s=5 202.8270 215.3555 255.2158 218.5868 184.6028
TABLE 4.2: Equilibrium Premium Values p˜si
Stages Insurer Insurer Insurer Insurer Insurer
s 1 2 3 4 5
s=1 955 2009 3080 1893 462
s=2 912 2018 3131 1792 433
s=3 874 2009 3184 1721 402
s=4 838 1999 3238 1653 373
s=5 801 2007 3285 1584 405
TABLE 4.3: Volume of Exposure qsi
Stages Insurer Insurer Insurer Insurer Insurer
s 1 2 3 4 5
s=1 50476 54879 130050 50999 14239
s=2 45525 55450 139840 38781 11308
s=3 40962 54348 144560 27500 8713
s=4 37460 53261 152520 19967 6317
s=5 33922 52313 159360 12304 8990
TABLE 4.4: Wealth wsi
Table 4.2 illustrates the calculated SPE profiles with the benchmark data from Table
4.1, the corresponding exposure volume and wealth are demonstrated in Table 4.3 and
Table 4.4 respectively. Given by the benchmark price sensitivity parameters, the whole
market intends to decrease premiums over the 5 stages. Market leader insurer 3 gains
Chapter 4. Multi-stage Stochastic General Insurance Games with Risk Aversion
Players 89
policies from other four insurers step by step and it is the only insurer who has a mono-
tone increasing wealth. 4 Since insurer 2 and insurer 4 have different risk averse degree,
the performance of these two players are significantly different. As expected, insurer 4
price its premium higher than insurer 2 at each stage of game in order to cover a higher
risk premium. Regarding the same µsi and σ
s
i over all 5 stages, insurer 2 accumulate
more wealth.
However, in realistic, µsi and σ
s
i could be different between insurers at different
stages due to market conditions. Insurance companies usually predict the values based
on previous stages’ information and market situations.
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FIGURE 4.1: Diversity of equilibrium premium profiles with different λ3. Regard-
ing the first stage game with other parameters remain the same in Table 4.1, insurer
3’s risk averse parameter is investigated, which takes values from 0.01 to 0.5. The
corresponding 6 different equilibrium premium profiles are given in the legend.
Regarding the first stage of game, Figure 4.1 investigates the equilibrium premium
profiles’ changes when the market leader insurer 3 change its degree of risk averse. The
other parameters remain the same in Table 4.1. As illustrated, its equilibrium premium
value increases as λ13 is larger and the whole market follows its pricing strategy. The
smaller scale of insurer, the change of premium is less. The similar situation happens
with different µ13 and σ
1
3 , which is shown in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 respectively.
4Market competition situation could be different with different price sensitivity parameters other than
the benchmark one.
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FIGURE 4.2: Diversity of equilibrium premium profiles with different µ3. Regarding
the first stage game with other parameters remain the same in Table 4.1, µ3 is investi-
gated, which takes values from 80 to 120. The corresponding 5 different equilibrium
premium profiles are given in the legend.
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FIGURE 4.3: Diversity of equilibrium premium profiles with different σ3. Regarding
the first stage game with other parameters remain the same in Table 4.1, σ3 is investi-
gated, which takes values from 0.1 to 0.3. The corresponding 5 different equilibrium
premium profiles are given in the legend.
Differ from the benchmark parameters in Table 4.1, µsi and σ
s
i keeps changing in
real insurance markets. Considering the random choice of µsi ∈ [70, 120] and σsi ∈
[0.01, 0.4], the equilibrium premium profiles of all 5 insurers over 5 stages are given in
Figure 4.4. Pricing cycles can be observed.
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FIGURE 4.4: Equilibrium Premium Profiles of 5 insurers over 5 stages.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis investigates game-theoretical approaches to pricing general insurance premi-
ums in competitive non-corporative market environments. Both deterministic stochastic
Games were constructed under different assumptions with the purpose of pricing equi-
librium premium by solve the games.
Chapter 2 models two-stage non-cooperative games in an insurance market to inves-
tigate how the competition impacts the pricing process of non-life insurance products.
Insurers compete to maximise their payoffs in a second stage by adjusting premium
pricing strategies, which leads to diversity of the volume of exposure. We further char-
acterise one insurer’s second-stage modified volume of exposure in a way that sums
up the exposure flows in or out during competitions with other insurers. The modi-
fied second volumes of exposure in any two insurers’ competition are characterised by
transferring one insurer’s second stage premium to the other’s first-stage premium and
modelling the changing volume through a definition of price elasticity. Two models are
discussed in detail regarding the modified volume of exposure: simple exposure differ-
ence model I (GI) and advanced exposure difference model II (GII). Using payoffs in
these two models, two N-player games are constructed with non-linear aggregate and
positive, compact but not necessarily convex, premium strategy sets. A potential game
with an aggregation technique is applied: we prove the existence of a pure Nash equi-
librium of these two games by determining the potential functions. Both games’ pure
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Nash equilibriums can be solved by calculating the best-response equation systems.
The numerical results for 12-player insurance games are presented under the framework
that the best-response selection premium strategies always provide the global maximum
value of the corresponding payoff function.
Chapter 3 models a generalized finite-time differential game in an insurance market
to study how the competition impacts the pricing process of non-life insurance products.
An optimal control theory approach is applied to determine premiums in the open-
loop Nash Equilibrium. Two models are proposed. The first one (Model I) adopts the
exponential demand function proposed by [54, 55] and [22], and the second one (Model
II) is formulated based on the aggregate exposure proposed by [62]. The motivation
behind the consideration and implementation of models I and II is related to compare
the existing directions in the corresponding insurance literature. Numerical examples
illustrate the premium dynamics, and show that premium cycles do exist in equilibrium
for the Model II.
Chapter 4 constructs a multi-stage stochastic game with risk aversion players. The
expenditures of insurance companies are discussed separately as exposure related costs
and non-exposure related costs. The exposure related break-even premium is modelled
as stochastic. A numerical example of 5 players during 5stages is shown to analyze the
effect of insurers’ risk averse on premium pricing.
To conclude, other than classic approaches of general insurance premium pricing,
this thesis studies the competition in insurance markets based on different game struc-
tures. Limited by the difficulty of adapting real data from market, the ad hoc parameters
are selected to obtain reasonable equilibrium premium values in numerical examples,
including pricing sensitivity parameters ai, market presence limit factor h, etc. Further
researches may be continued with two directions: adapting new concepts from game
theory to investigate the premium pricing strategy in general insurance market; or, im-
prove the exist models with characterizing the algorithm of parameters’ selection.
Bibliography
[1] Ravi P Agarwal, Maria Meehan, and Donal O’Regan. Fixed point theory and
applications, volume 141. Cambridge university press, 2001.
[2] C. Alos-Ferrer and A. B. Ania. The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive
behavior. Economic Theory, 26(3):497–516, 2005.
[3] Kenneth J Arrow. The theory of risk aversion. Essays in the theory of risk-bearing,
pages 90–120, 1971.
[4] T. J. Boonen. Nash equilibria of over-the-counter bargaining for insurance risk re-
distributions: The role of a regulator. European Journal of Operational Research,
250(3):955–965, 2016.
[5] K. H. Borch. Application of game theory to some problems in automobile insur-
ance. ASTIN Bulletin, 2(2):208–221, 1962.
[6] K. H. Borch. The mathematical theory of insurance: an annotated selection of
papers on insurance published 1960-1972. Lexington Books, 1974.
[7] P. Brockett and X. Xia. Operations research in insurance: a review. Transactions
of the Society of Actuaries, XLVII:7–88, 1995.
[8] John M Clapp. Quantity competition in spatial markets with incomplete informa-
tion. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100(2):519–528, 1985.
94
Bibliography 95
[9] A. E. Cretu and R. J. Brodie. The influence of brand image and company repu-
tation where manufacturers market to small firms: A customer value perspective.
Industrial Marketing Management, 36(2):230–240, 2007.
[10] D. J. Cummins and F. J. Outreville. An international analysis of underwriting
cycles in property-liability insurance. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 54(2):246–
262, 1987.
[11] J. D. Cummins and P. M. Danzon. Price, financial quality, and capital flows in
insurance markets. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 6(1):3–38, 1997.
[12] C. D. Daykin and G. B. Hey. Managing uncertainty in a general insurance com-
pany. Journal of the Institute of Actuaries, 117(02):173–277, 1990.
[13] C. D. Daykin, T. Pentikainen, and M. Pesonen. Practical risk theory for actuaries.
CRC Press, 1994.
[14] E. Dockner, S. Jørgensen, N. Van Long, and G. Sorger. Differential games in
economics and management science. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
[15] N. A. Doherty and H. B. Kang. Interest rates and insurance price cycles. Journal
of Banking & Finance, 12(2):199–214, 1988.
[16] P. Dubey, O. Haimanko, and A. Zapechelnyuk. Strategic complements and substi-
tutes, and potential games. Games and Economic Behavior, 54(1):77–94, 2006.
[17] C. Dutang, H. Albrecher, and S. Loisel. Competition among non-life insurers
under solvency constraints: A game-theoretic approach. European Journal of
Operational Research, 231(3):702–711, 2013.
[18] P. Emms. Dynamic pricing of general insurance in a competitive market. ASTIN
Bulletin, 37(01):1–34, 2007.
[19] P. Emms. Pricing general insurance with constraints. Insurance: Mathematics and
Economics, 40(2):335–355, 2007.
Bibliography 96
[20] P. Emms. A stochastic demand model for optimal pricing of non-life insurance
policies. In Mathematical Control Theory and Finance, pages 113–136. Springer,
2008.
[21] P. Emms. Pricing general insurance in a reactive and competitive market. Journal
of Computational and Applied Mathematics, 236(6):1314–1332, 2011.
[22] P. Emms. Equilibrium pricing of general insurance policies. North American
Actuarial Journal, 16(3):323–349, 2012.
[23] P. Emms and S. Haberman. Pricing general insurance using optimal control theory.
ASTIN Bulletin, 35(02):427–453, 2005.
[24] P. Emms and S. Haberman. Optimal management of an insurers exposure in a com-
petitive general insurance market. North American Actuarial Journal, 13(1):77–
105, 2009.
[25] P. Emms, S. Haberman, and I. Savoulli. Optimal strategies for pricing general
insurance. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 40(1):15–34, 2007.
[26] Dimitris Fotakis, Alexis C Kaporis, and Paul G Spirakis. Atomic congestion
games: Fast, myopic and concurrent. Theory of Computing Systems, 47(1):38–
59, 2010.
[27] Drew Fudenberg and David K Levine. The theory of learning in games, volume 2.
MIT press, 1998.
[28] Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole. Game theory, 1991. Cambridge, Massachusetts,
393, 1991.
[29] Philippe Jehiel and Dov Samet. Learning to play games in extensive form by val-
uation. In Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality
and knowledge, pages 299–303. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., 2001.
Bibliography 97
[30] M. K. Jensen. Aggregative games and best-reply potentials. Economic Theory,
43(1):45–66, 2010.
[31] N. S. Kukushkin. Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggrega-
tion. Games and Economic Behavior, 48(1):94–110, 2004.
[32] J. Lamm-Tennant and M. A. Weiss. International insurance cycles: Rational ex-
pectations/institutional intervention. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 64(3):415–
439, 1997.
[33] J. Lemaire. An application of game theory: cost allocation. ASTIN Bulletin,
14(1):61–81, 1984.
[34] J. Lemaire. Cooperative game theory and its insurance applications. ASTIN Bul-
letin, 21(1):17–40, 1991.
[35] A. P. Lerner. The concept of monopoly and the measurement of monopoly power.
The Review of Economic Studies, 1(3):157–175, 1934.
[36] V. K. Malinovskii. Competition-originated cycles and insurance strategies. ASTIN
Bulletin, 40(2):797–843, 2010.
[37] D. Martimort and L. Stole. Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate
games with applications to common agency. Games and Economic Behavior,
76(2):753–772, 2012.
[38] D. Monderer and L. S. Shapley. Fictitious play property for games with identical
interests. Journal of Economic Theory, 68(1):258–265, 1996.
[39] D. Monderer and L. S. Shapley. Potential games. Games and Economic Behavior,
14(1):124–143, 1996.
[40] Martin J Osborne. An introduction to game theory, volume 3. Oxford university
press New York, 2004.
Bibliography 98
[41] A. A Pantelous and E. Passalidou. Optimal premium pricing policy in a compet-
itive insurance market environment. Annals of Actuarial Science, 7(2):175–191,
2013.
[42] A. A. Pantelous and E. Passalidou. Optimal premium pricing strategies for
competitive general insurance markets. Applied Mathematics and Computation,
259:858–874, 2015.
[43] A. A. Pantelous and E. Passalidou. Optimal strategies for a nonlinear premium-
reserve model in a competitive insurance market. Annals of Actuarial Science,
11(1):1–19, 2017.
[44] M. K. Polborn. A model of an oligopoly in an insurance market. The Geneva
Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, 23(1):41–48, 1998.
[45] M. R. Powers and M. Shubik. On the tradeoff between the law of large numbers
and oligopoly in insurance. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 23(2):141–
156, 1998.
[46] M. R. Powers, M. Shubik, and S. T. Yao. Insurance market games: Scale effects
and public policy. Journal of Economics, 67(2):109–134, 1998.
[47] J. Rantala. Fluctuations in insurance business results: Some control theoretic as-
pects. In 23rd International Congress of Actuaries, 1988.
[48] R. Rees, H. Gravelle, and A. Wambach. Regulation of insurance markets. The
Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, 24(1):55–68, 1999.
[49] T. Rolski, H. Schmidli, V. Schmidt, and J. Teugels. Stochastic processes for insur-
ance and finance, volume 505. John Wiley & Sons, 2009.
[50] M. Rothschild and J. Stiglitz. Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An
essay on the economics of imperfect information. Springer, 1992.
Bibliography 99
[51] Michael Rothschild and Joseph Stiglitz. Equilibrium in competitive insurance
markets: An essay on the economics of imperfect information. The quarterly
journal of economics, pages 629–649, 1976.
[52] R. Selten. Preispolitik der Mehrproduktenunternehmung in der statischen Theorie,
volume 16. Springer-Verlag, 1970.
[53] Matthew J Sobel. Myopic solutions of markov decision processes and stochastic
games. Operations Research, 29(5):995–1009, 1981.
[54] G. C. Taylor. Underwriting strategy in a competitive insurance environment. In-
surance: Mathematics and Economics, 5(1):59–77, 1986.
[55] G. C. Taylor. Expenses and underwriting strategy in competition. Insurance:
Mathematics and Economics, 6(4):275–287, 1987.
[56] G. C. Taylor. A simple model of insurance market dynamics. North American
Actuarial Journal, 12(3):242–262, 2008.
[57] K-L. Teo. A unified computational approach to optimal control problems. In
Proceedings of the first world congress on World congress of nonlinear analysts,
volume III, pages 2763–2774. Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1996.
[58] J. Teugels and B. Sundt. Encyclopedia of actuarial science. John Wiley & Sons,
2004.
[59] D. M. Topkis. Supermodularity and complementarity. Princeton University Press,
1998.
[60] M. Voorneveld. Best-response potential games. Economics Letters, 66(3):289–
295, 2000.
[61] R. A. Winter. The dynamics of competitive insurance markets. Journal of Finan-
cial Intermediation, 3(4):379–415, 1994.
Bibliography 100
[62] R. Wu and A. A. Pantelous. Potential games with aggregation in non-cooperative
general insurance markets. ASTIN Bulletin, 47(1):269–302, 2017.
